# Fem IR Supplement – NEG

## Links

### Activism Link

#### The cooption of femnism under anti cap movements renforce the sexism in these spaces just pushes women out of the space, the left doesn’t care about femnism no matter how much they say they do

Dibben 21 (Dibben, Kimmy. “Sexism in the Campus Left.” Honi Soit, Honisoit, 17 Aug. 2021, http://honisoit.com/2021/08/sexism-in-the-campus-left/.)

As proven in multiple high-profile cases in Federal and State Parliament this year, sexual violence and sexism are rife in politics. This is not limited to right-wing political organisations, as was shown in the Greens case in 2018. Nor is it limited to political parties. We need not look further than our very own campus to recognise that under the progressive veneer of left-wing activist organisations are structural issues of sexism, misogyny, gendered labour and abuse. There is not one such organisation on USyd’s campus that is free of this. Imperialist, sexist, racist and classist structures are replicated in spaces where we organise against them, and reconstitute themselves endlessly in individual interactions by default.

Misogyny runs perniciously throughout the campus left. One woman who has been isolated and socially expelled by such a culture, writes that misogyny in the left manifests as “everything from unequal distributions of labour to the full blown espousing of Incel ideological world views. It became clear that even multi-year membership within an ostensibly progressive faction on campus could fail to meaningfully circumvent a lifetime of learned sexism as well as classism, an inherent and tragic outcome of elite private boys school education.”

Leftist men of higher social capital have used such advantage to get away with everything from publicly belittling and casting doubt against female activists’ abilities, to sexual coercion preyed upon younger, less experienced women. Known rapists and abusers are routinely invited to parties and social events, their victims the ones left off the invite list while other members still invited remain silent and complicit. Anonymous contributors recount bystanders who follow abusers to parties to ‘keep an eye on them’, afraid of their behaviour towards women in private, all the while bolstering their character in public.

One reason why abusive behavior, including sexual violence, is ubiquitous amongst the campus left is the desperate desire of these groups to protect their external reputation. With groups jockeying for support in elections and factionally-driven campaigns alike, what emerges within the group is a culture of unaddressed conflict, ‘justified’ as to keep the faction united. Even more galling is the insinuation that the ‘negative peace’ created is in service of the greater good of activism, rather than to protect the reputation of a faction and its most prominent figureheads. The glamourising and self-important lens through which each group sees itself makes it easy for the safety and respect of activist women and people of colour to be overlooked. The cycles of silence created force such people to face the difficult decision of ignoring their own grievances and remaining in a space that is hostile to them, or leaving their own faction, leaving them without personal and political support, and in most cases, pushing them out of activity. The uneasy silence around abusive behaviour have caused dozens of women to ignore their own grievances, disengage, or leave altogether.

I spoke to one survivor whom had chosen leaving altogether:

“Despite there being a general knowledge amongst our peers of the hurt that my ex had caused, there seemed to be no precedent to address it, at least from my perspective. Everywhere I turned, I saw the people I was looking up to, seemingly complicit in his behaviour, which only seemed to be continuing on its steady trajectory.

I was aware of the fact that there were grievance processes in place to address issues such as these. However, no matter how much I longed to feel as if I could call the space my own, it had gotten to the point where I did not feel as if there could be any possible outcome to the accountability process that would make this my reality. Too much time had passed, too much more had happened, I felt that I had no right to still be hurting, no right to disrupt the bonds and allyships that had formed long before I entered the scene. I believed then that I was being shown that it was not the right place for me if I could not move past this history. I decided to leave the space.

There is something so deeply rotten about this culture within the left. It is not a new story, for activist spaces – supposedly ‘safe’ spaces – to be the very ones which turn a blind eye to the pain being inflicted by their own members, to the misogynistic manipulation, abuse, and sexual violence that runs deep within its core. The cracks have always been there in the facade – it’s past time that we gutted this rotten culture, and lay a new foundation of genuine accountability, and radical healing for survivors.”

It is no coincidence that there is both a lack of leftist men at feminist rallies and a structural issue of sexism in leftist organising. I can count on one hand the number of male comrades that turn up to consent workshops, rallies against sexual violence on campus, or other WoCo events. Men don’t run grievance processes, men don’t check in on struggling comrades, men don’t step in when other men make sexist remarks. This is un-glamorous, unseen, difficult work done largely by women and non-binary people; not always because we want to, but because it otherwise won’t be done at all. When men do take this work on, it is after our own pleading and head-kicking. In these rare instances it is lauded as exceptional and a reflection of good character, though not when women or non-binary people do it.

Men do not show up in the streets, and they do not show up interpersonally. The disparity between praxis and one’s so-called politics is most obvious when it comes to men in the left not proving the anti-sexism they claim to believe in. It takes constant and active self-reflection to unlearn ingrained sexist behaviour – yes, even from leftists. Anti-sexism is not just a political identity, but a continuous call to action. These left-wing spaces can hardly claim such a title if the basic tenets of feminism are ignored.

Feminist organising on campus is not respected, nor are the Women’s Officers who lead it. Our specialised skills and knowledge in the intricacies of trauma, gendered violence, and feminist activism holds little value in the left. This has to change. Our specific knowledge and experiences are irreplaceable. Our work has spanned decades and positively impacted the lives of thousands of students. However, factional support has never been extended to women’s officers the way it has to many other major SRC positions. This is not unique to my term, but a trend that Women’s Officers before me can attest to.

What more do we need to do to gain respect? No other group or person on campus is criticised from the right and management quite like the Women’s Officers. Women’s Officers over the years have received countless disclosures of sexual violence, been doxxed by right-wing extremists, spat on and swung at by Nazis, threatened with violence and death, gone through many misconduct processes, suspended and expelled from campus, and rolled from their position by Liberals (only to continue to convene WoCo unpaid all year). This would be hard enough but the difficulty and isolation of this position is magnified by the attitude of the Left. Looking at recent history alone, Women’s Officers have been publicly belittled for making political critiques, have had their anti-sexual violence work deemed ‘irrelevant’ to ‘more important’ campaigns, and been met consistently with apathy when asking for help combatting direct far-right violence. This position is incredibly difficult and isolating, and needs more support from the comrades around us.

Many have contributed directly to this article, all remaining anonymous for their own wellbeing. However, I have truly compiled this article from months and years of more conversations than I can count, over many dinner tables, at the back of bars, after WoCo meetings, in hushed tones, in the raised voice of frustration, and through teary eyes. These are not just my encounters, but those of so many of us. I thank every person brave enough to share these experiences.

I believe in mass organising of the student left which prioritises feminist liberation is possible, if only the feminists leading it are respected and supported like they deserve. This week, both Women’s Officers will leave our faction due to structural sexism, just as the Education Officer, Maddie Clark, left hers for the same reason only months ago. I hope this article does not spur gossip, but sparks deep reflection amongst the campus left. I hope my comrades look around and reckon with the behaviour of their male comrades, notice the lack of female comrades — particularly women of colour and working class women — and ask themselves how their very own behaviour is impeding, or even opposing, the liberatory work we aim to do. Because without accountability, harm will only continue to shatter community, and “without community there is no liberation”.

### AI Link

#### The idea that AI is gender neutral is complete BS—as long as the programmers are biased, so too is their creation

**Roff 16** (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)

The base knowledge provided and the process by which it is accessed is key. What “facts” or pieces of information go into the database will affect the actions of the machine. If a data point or “piece” is not present, there is no opportunity for it to get there. An AI might be able to rearrange existing bits of information to combine them into new insights, but it will never generate something outside of its existing set of information structures. There is a gatekeeping function present in the construction of all symbolic representations. As Adam (1998) notes, “A formal system, in other words a computer system, is a political choice to maintain existing power structures” (108).16 To bring this back to gendered warbots, if programmers decide that “child” as an object or representation can never be paired with “combatant,” then the machine will not be capable of identifying child soldiers. Moreover, what constitutes “child” will have to be represented in some way. The process by which such “knowledge” is represented is thus crucial. As Adam (1998) explains, the problem about deciding “what sort of objects there are in the world” becomes another problem about knowledge about “facts,” and how a knowledge base about “facts” is recreated within a system of purely propositional knowledge” (39).17 The purely propositional knowledge approach is open to all of the feminist critiques from feminist epistemology, in particular, that there is some sort of Truth about which the facts must correspond and that knowledge derived from skills (such as a “knowing how”) is not real knowledge (Adam 1998, 114). Warfighting is as much an art as it is a science, and so prohibiting this kind of embodied or practical knowledge would appear to undermine the ability of a warbot to fight effectively. The most pressing problem for symbolic systems, however, comes from the direction of analogical reasoning. Faced with the certainty that warbots will encounter complex situations, which they cannot have prior knowledge of, they will require some mechanism to abstract the situation to one about which they do have some higher order representation. This is done by way of analogy. A program will have to break down the situation into smaller objects that it can represent, and then it will search its database for something that is analogous where the concepts are equivalent or appropriate. To find such an abstract analogy, the AI uses stereotypes (Adam 1998, 39).18 Programmers may not readily admit to this, claiming that “the important thing is to break the overall experience reflected in the memory into composable regularities” (Storrs Hall 2007, 221). “Composable regularities” might be that all hills are convex physical structures, but they might also be that “all women speak with a high voice” or “all combatants are men between 18 and 35.” Reasoning by analogy is a heuristic that humans employ when they are being cognitive misers and is not appropriate for complex situations requiring critical thought.19 This brings us full circle to the problem of which objects and concepts get represented in the dataset. If the programmers, who are predominantly white, male, upper-middle class and academic, equip an AI with these perspectives, then it is not difficult to see how gendered constructions will reproduce themselves (AAUW 2015). A particular masculinity might be reproduced, or a particular view of femininity may not be modeled at all (Adam 1998, 23). In either case, the AI is clearly not “gender neutral.”

### Biotech Link

#### The language of bio science is entrenched in masculine ideals and norms- absent the alternative the aff just recreates harmful masculinity.

Connell 05, (RW Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinities, RW Connell was formerly a professor at the University of Sydney and an Australian sociologist)GP

But the appeal to science plunges us into circularity. For it has been shown, in convincing historical detail, that natural science itself has a gendered character. Western science and technology are culturally masculinized. This is not a question of personnel, though it is a fact that the great majority of scientists and technologists are men. The guiding metaphors. of scientific research, the impersonality of its discourse, the structures of power and communication in science, the reproduction of its internal culture, all stem from the social position of dominant men in a gendered world. The dominance of science in discussions of masculinity thus reflects the position of masculinity (or specific masculinities) in the social relations of gender.7 In that case, what can be expected from a science of masculinity, being a form of knowledge created by the very power it claims to study? Any such knowledge will be as ethically compromised as a science of race created by imperialists, or a science of capitalism produced by capitalists. There are, indeed, forms of scientific talk about masculinity that have capitulated to the dominant interests in much the same way as scientific racism and neoconservative economics.

#### Biotechnology reinforces imperial patriarchy across the globe

Shiva 92, (V Shiva, 1992, *Women, Ecology, and Health: Rebuilding Connections: Introduction*, published in the National Library of Medicine, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12286886/)GP

 Indigenous seeds, called landraces, were considered valueless, like indigenous peoples before them. Value was added to seeds only after an investment of time and money. The economic impact of this artificial value assigned to a gift of nature will be seen in Third World countries as plant breeders demand "rights" under new utility patents. The plant breeders, who are attempting to substitute local plant diversity with patented seeds throughout the world, go so far as to want laws to prevent farmers from using seeds gleaned from patented plants they have cultivated. Biotechnology is now treating human reproduction in the same proprietary way. Childbirth has been mechanized, and knowledge and skills are considered to be lodged with physicians, not with mothers. By transforming pregnancy into a medical disease, professional management, once confined to abnormal cases, is now considered necessary in every case. In cases of "abnormal" infertility, physicians believe they "create" babies, using the ~~woman's~~ body as so much raw material. The absurdity of this notion of man as creator can be seen by the patent application for the gene sequence coding for the hormone relaxin, which is produced in ~~female~~ ovaries but is being treated as an "invention" which can be owned. This attempt on the part of man to totally engineer the world, including the basic regenerative functions of the seed and ~~women's~~ bodies, is brought into question by the current crisis in health and ecology.

### Bioweapons Link

#### Discourse and fear of bioweaponry is gendered feminine- MDC’s utilize discourse and banning of biological warfare to justify feminizing and repressing LDCs

Cecire 09, (Ruth Cecire, Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65, Feminist Studies, Inc., <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40607923>) GP

Gender, in addition to the practical concerns already discussed, appears to offer auseful prism through which to contemplate these issues. The feminine/masculine divide is a (or perhaps "the") critical hermeneutic through which each society constructs experience, assigns meaning, and asserts its basic values. Bridging the essentialist/constructionist rift, I would argue that this divide is informed by a conflation of biological difference and cultural representation. It is my contention that bioweapons have been disdained and ostensibly banned, at least in part, because they are largely gendered female and, hence, do not serve the fantasies and ends of the patriarchal war system; their semi-androgynous amalgam of science and disease fuels and substantiates extant culture and gender wars. As instruments of terror for the aforementioned "disenfranchised" nations and groups, they connote the mythical "furies" of "disempowered" female rage. That is not to say that bioweapons will never be employed by First World powers but, rather, that gendered perceptions shape their geopolitical status and deter potential use. Evidencing what Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild refer to as the "metaphorically gendered relationship between rich and poor countries,"36 First World males are intent on safeguarding their advantage by denying their Third World (disempowered) counterparts access to weaponry that would equalize the destructive playing field. Lastly, inasmuch as each weapon system conveys a certain status, banning a class of weapons, declaring them outlaw armaments, functions to further demean potential users.

### Climate Technics Link/Case turn

#### The K turns the aff – domination and technocracy embed the cycle of environmental destruction into politics

Bluhdom 09, [Ingolfur Blühdorn¶ is Associate Professor in Politics / Political Sociology at the Department of European Studies at the University of Bath Locked into the politics of unsustainability <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2009-10-30-bluhdorn-en.html>, 2009] Mr.Mr.

One reason is that in functionally differentiated and rapidly internationalising societies, the existing political institutions lack the structural ability to formulate and implement coordinated and effective policy approaches. Yet there is more to it than this. In order to see the arguably most powerful obstacle to major ecological progress, we need to focus on the values and paradigms governing national as well as international environmental policy-making. ¶ Since the mid-1980s, environmental politics has incrementally come to be dominated by a policy paradigm that is inherently incapable of organising the category of change that the IPCC targets necessitate. This is the paradigm of sustainability, ecological modernisation and, in its most recent appearances, "ecological industrial politics" and the "Green New Deal".[1] For all the good they have done in terms of turning environmentalism into a "new ideological masterframe" and a "non-controversial collective concern",[2] the concept of sustainability as well as the strategy of ecological modernisation have proved unable to deliver the "break with traditional models of economic development"[3] which are now widely recognised as indispensable for the effective mitigation of climate change. This is even more applicable to the latest addition to the lexicon of green-speak, the Green New Deal. ¶ Sustainability is interpreted by national governments as well as transnational bodies such as the EU first and foremost as sustained economic growth and competitiveness securing the continuation of established lifestyles and patterns of societal development. Its fundamental weakness is that as a purely formal concept (do not use up more resources than can be reproduced) it does not contain any inherent specification of what is to be counted as a resource (do polar bears count or not?), at which level an equilibrium between use and reproduction is to be achieved (before or after the destruction of Indonesian rain forests?) and which political values or principles are to be implemented in the envisaged society (authoritarian or democratic; decentralised or centralised; egalitarian or polarised).[4] ¶ Ecological modernisation (EM), in turn, is a market and technology-oriented policy strategy fraught with inherent limitations. For key environmental problems (e.g. habitat destruction, soil erosion, bio-diversity loss), marketable technological fixes are simply not available; environmental efficiency gains are persistently over-compensated by rebound effects and ongoing processes of growth; and all ecological modernisation depends on targets that are circumscribed by the ability to generate political legitimation and public support. Perhaps most importantly, though, EM ultimately just renews and extends the logic of growth and consumption which political ecologists as well as the much more moderate UN Brundtland Report[5] once identified as the underlying cause of industrial society's unsustainability. ¶ More explicitly even than EM approaches, the new ecological industrial politics and the Green New Deal aim first and foremost to spur technological innovation, increase consumer demand, create new jobs, open up new export markets, enhance the international competitiveness of national economies and so forth. In other words, they reframe global warming and the environmental crisis as an opportunity, a tool, for a new round of innovation and growth. They are supposed to provide a double, or even triple, dividend (economic, environmental, social), yet they entirely reverse the relation between means and ends that had once been envisaged by those proposing the use of economic or market based instruments for the achievement of ecological goals. In practice they are primarily an attempt to prolong the life expectancy of what is known to be unsustainable. Even Europe's leading Green Party, the once fairly radical German Greens, have fully embraced this rhetoric.

### COVID Link

#### Identifying COVID 19 as a security threat reinforce and recreate hierarchal gendered identities in order to enforce its securitization

**Kuteleva and Clifford 2021** (Anna Kuteleva is a postdoctoral research fellow at the School of International Regional Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (Russia). Anna holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada). Sarah J. Clifford is an MSc student in Political Science at the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). Her Master’s project explores the intersections of American militarised masculinities, identity politics, and education policies. Clifford studied Political Science and worked as a Research Assistant for the China Institute and the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta. “Gendered securitisation: Trump’s and Putin’s discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic,” European Journal of International Security (2021), 6, 301–317 doi:10.1017/eis.2021.5)

It is already all too apparent around the world that COVID-19 is dangerous. In the modern history of natural disasters, this virus will have few rivals. States continue to wrestle with how best to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, but its securitisation is already universal.1 The mechanisms of securitisation are socially and culturally specific. Simply put, all states securitise COVID-19 but each state does so in a unique way. By identifying the pandemic as an existential security threat, national decision-makers respond to it from both operational and normative perspectives. In doing so, they actualise and perform some national identities, while excluding or silencing others. We scrutinise this process by drawing on the cases of the United States and Russia. Experiences of these two states matter because they both play an active role in the evolving global discursive politics of the COVID-19 pandemic and consistently appear among the top ten most affected countries. Moreover, there is a divergence between the resurgence of the Cold War-style geopolitical confrontation between the West and Russia and the diplomatic ‘bromance’ between the US President Donald Trump and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.2 These two politicians present themselves as alpha males promising to make their nations ‘great again’. As Sarah Ashwin and Jennifer Utrata point out, both of them attract immense international attention, and hence ‘these hypermasculine performances are not merely national in scope, but shape other places in our globalized world’. 3 Building our analysis on feminist methodologies,4 we examine how Trump and Putin instrumentalise hierarchical gendered identities to enforce the securitisation of COVID-19. Our analysis shows that both Trump and Putin draw heavily on projections of gendered power to maximise the effect of their securitisation moves and mobilise diverse gendered narratives, imageries, and practices to construct the meaning of the threat. These performances of securitisation set standards of appropriateness and legitimise certain kinds of foreign policy responses to the pandemic while silencing others or presenting them as ineffective. In this sense, we contribute to the discussion of COVID-19 politics by exploring gendered discursive practices that enable the move from ‘normal’ politics to the domain of emergency and exception or, as Andreas Kalyvas puts it, to the ‘politics of the extraordinary’. 5 This areticle is organised into three sections. The first section outlines our approach to securitisation and the methodology of our study. The following two sections examine the dynamics of securitising COVID-19 in the United States and Russia, indicating differences and similarities in their discursive strategies. The conclusions raise and bring to the fore questions not only regarding political responses to the COVID-19 pandemic but also concerning the nature and outcomes of the securitisation process.

#### The Securitization of COVID-19 is emblematic of National Leaders’ desires to secure their nation’s place as the masculine hegemon and their place as its ruler, reconstructing narratives of toxic masculine power and weak feminine subordinates

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Securitisation is ‘a set of interrelated practices and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that bring threats into being’. 6 The concept of securitisation opens up a way to denaturalise the framing of certain events, issues, things, or people as posing existential threats to states and societies.7 Many scholars also use it to call into question the givenness of the differential categories of ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’. 8 Scholars who examine the politics of diseases, however, often deal with threats that are not talked into being. For example, using the case of HIV/AIDS, Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton argue9 that to question the ‘reality’ of the threat posed by a disease is ‘both morally indefensible and empirically absurd’. Similarly, the danger that COVID-19 presents is all too real. More than two million people are known to have died from COVID-19 as of January 2021. A year has passed since the virus was discovered, yet hospitals are still buckling under a torrent of COVID-19 patients and the routines of daily life remain interrupted for billions worldwide. Importantly, COVID-19 is an endemic that will stay with us for some time. In this context**, the concept of securitisation is used not to question the threat that COVID-19 poses for the survival and wellbeing of people around the world but to elucidate how political actors reconstruct understandings of COVID-19 via securitising moves and what different pathways of response become appropriate as a result of these moves**. Consequently, we treat securitisation as ‘a sustained strategic practice aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development … is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it’. 10 Adopting Thierry Balzacq’s approach,11 we do not problematise the fact of securitisation but critically examine how and with what effect discursive politics of securitisation works. Specifically, we are interested in how state actors that dominate discursive politics of (in)security performatively build upon established and context-specific gendered identities in the process of securitisation. The very notion of national security is gendered inasmuch as it is grounded in the gendered nature of the state and state practices.12 This entails that power operates via the (discursive) construction and reconstruction of hierarchical hybrid gendered identities with the intent to enforce certain security interests on domestic and international levels. As Charlotte Hooper emphasises, ‘it is a commonplace observation that international relations reflect a world of men in that they influence international affairs through their physical capacities, through (masculinist) practices at the institutional level, and through the symbolic links between masculinity and power’. 13 Consequently, Hooper argues that masculinity is hegemonic, meaning that specific forms of masculinity dominate over all other gendered identities, including other masculinities. These relatively stable hegemonic configurations of gender practices exemplify ‘the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women’. 14 Following this logic, hegemonic masculinity is instrumental in constructing threat and danger as well as performing security. Hegemonic masculinity takes on many forms depending on different social, political, and economic settings. In this sense, it is dynamic and context-specific. Each state’s potential to claim the status of the masculine hegemon in the international arena depends on its performance among other states and its ability to repel threats both domestically and internationally. National leaders actualise and perform hegemonic masculinities to convince audiences at home and abroad that they are able to combat a threat. Masculinised imageries allow national leaders to present security as a result of their rule, making that rule legitimate. In effect, performing a state’s hegemonic masculinity ties directly to its leader’s ability to securitise a threat. Importantly, the process of securitising not only represents but also is reproductive of hegemonic masculinity of the state. National leaders rearticulate it through the narratives and imageries evoked in their securitising moves. Drawing on this theoretical framework, we examine how national leaders in the United States and Russia reconstitute hegemonic masculinities within the ‘threat-defence’ logic of responses to the COVID-19 outbreak. Our sample includes statements on COVID-19 made by Trump and Putin from the early onset of the current global public health crisis to 30 April 2020. This time frame covers an important period in the discursive formation of the COVID-19 outbreak in both the United States and Russia as a matter of national security. It allows us to examine securitisation in the making rather than focus on the audience’s acceptance of securitising moves. In other words, the chosen time frame restricts our analysis to the very first performative attempts at securitising the pandemic.

#### Trump used COVID to secure the US’s masculinity by portraying it as the strong, masculine hegemon ready to defend both its own weak, and destroy the weakness around it to prevent “contamination”

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In a paralleled vein to feminist discussions of 9/11, COVID-19 produces what Bonnie Mann calls the ‘unmanning’ of America.18 Mann details how sovereignty is a ‘style of national masculinity’ with any violation of a nation’s borders resulting in its figurative demasculinisation.19 Accordingly, the pandemic challenges the American doctrines of absolute sovereignty, invulnerability, and global hegemony. To counter this threat, Trump reframes it not as a public health dilemma but as a threat to the nation’s security and hegemonic masculinity. In this setting, COVID-19 presents a direct threat to the national body that is innately gendered. On 4 February Trump securitises COVID-19.20 However, in January and February, Trump struggles with fully committing to the securitising move and vacillates between securitising and desecuritising the spread of COVID-19. At first, Trump frames the virus only as a ‘potential threat’ contained in China.21 Simultaneously, he assures his audience that ‘[o]ur country is prepared for any circumstances’ and that ‘there’s no reason to panic at all’ as the possibility of exposure and mortality to the American nation ‘remain[s] low’. 22 It is not until 13 March that Trump constructs COVID-19 as an existential crisis and ‘national emergency’, one that not only threatens the nation’s health but also has the power to obstruct its sovereignty and security.23 As specified by Trump, one of the existential challenges of the pandemic is that the United States will face the ‘public health consequences of a mass uncontrolled cross-border movement’. 24 Starting from the presidential campaign in 2015, Trump persistently pushes migration out of the domain of ‘normal politics’. As the pandemic unfolds, he builds upon the image of the othered and villainised migrant to redefine COVID-19 not only as a health hazard but also as a security threat that can compromise the nation’s sovereignty. Trump personifies these fears in undocumented migrants who potentially carry COVID-19. This extra discursive layer highlights how the perceived threat to America’s sovereignty elevates the virus from a public health dilemma to a national security crisis through the processes of Othering. For example, he emphasises that they threaten to create a perfect storm that would spread the infection to our border agents, migrants, and to the public at large. Left unchecked, this would cripple our immigration system, overwhelm our healthcare system, and severely damage our national security.25 As a response, Trump affirmatively declares that ‘we’re not going to let that happen’. 26 Sara Ahmed explains such a discursive reconstruction as an attempt to monopolise and ‘eliminate the source of fear’ – a move by the state to control the uncontrollable through asserting selfdetermination and containment.27 In other words, Trump portrays the United States as no longer fearful but as a nation that is mobilised to repel the dangerous Other. This construction also frames Trump and his administration as the protectors of the nation (‘we’) from the existential threat (‘they’) by concurrently securitising and desecuritising COVID-19. Trump’s narrative does not alleviate the threat of the pandemic but, counterintuitively, dispels notions of fear and security to discursively embolden his masculine command over the nation. COVID-19 is not only embodied by the undocumented migrant but is also personified through a multiplicity of Others. To shift the blame for the harms of the COVID-19 outbreak, Trump fixates on China and racialises the pandemic as a ‘Chinese’ threat. Since 21 January, Trump obsessively emphasises that COVID-19 ‘comes from China’ and should be regarded as the ‘Chinese virus’ or ‘Wuhan virus’. 28 Restricting international travel from China to the United States, Trump labels his executive order the ‘China ban’, stating that ‘China, you can’t come in. I’m sorry.’ 29 While the United States evades an attack from the virus by shutting its borders and taking strong actions, China is presented as weak and incapable. According to Trump, the COVID-19 outbreak ‘could have been stopped in China, before it started, and it wasn’t’ and now ‘the whole world is suffering because of it’. 30 China is portrayed as a soft nation because of its permeable borders, passivity, and ineffective leadership. The feminine softness makes it not only vulnerable but also dangerous. By differentiating and separating the nation from the pandemicstricken Others, Trump does not allow the insecurity of COVID-19 to feminise the United States and, in turn, (re)secures America’s masculinity. By framing COVID-19 as a destabilising force to the United States’ masculinity, Trump mobilises the nation around three gendered narratives to perform and actualise American hegemony: the gendered construction of the national ‘we’, militarisation, and displays of the United States’ economic omnipotence. These three discursive formations function as applicators to deconstruct how the nation is mobilised to repel the threat. Building on this logic, Trump’s performances of certain hegemonic traits demonstrate how gender practices become a securitising tool utilised by national leaders in times of crisis. The performative values that the American state believes its citizens personify are embedded in these gender practices. In Trump’s words, Americans are those who ‘do not despair’. 31 He argues that ‘we do not give in to fear’ and ‘we pull together, we persevere, and we overcome, and we win’. 32 Americans ‘sacrifice together’, 33 but, as Ahmed puts it, the nation is presented as winning by ‘refusing to transform its vulnerability and wounds … into an affective response of fear’. 34 A response that is premised on exemplifying the masculine characteristics of ‘valour’, aggression, and determination in times of combat. These characteristics frame the nation as being militarised and in a perpetual state of conflict that will not dissipate until the threat has been vanquished: As our citizens persevere through this present challenge, we’re renewing American unity and we’re replenishing American will and we are witnessing new American valor each and every day. We see it every day. The daring and determination of our people in this crisis reminds us that no matter how hard it gets, no matter what obstacles we must overcome, Americans will keep on fighting to victory and we will secure the glorious future that our citizens so richly deserve, especially after going through this nightmare, this evil beast.35 Here, Trump constructs the notion of an ‘internal strength’ that the American populace epitomises – one that transforms the emotions of fear and insecurity into the imagery of mobilisation and collective triumph.36 In this framework, the nation escapes potential feminisation by acting as a wilful subject and taking command of the pandemic. To further denote a sense of control and agency, Trump uses active verbs to place the United States not as a passive, feminised observer but as an active, masculine participant. By positioning the United States as one that is ‘renewing’, ‘replenishing’, and ‘witnessing’, Trump construes the nation as actively mobilising and hence, enacting its masculinity against COVID-19. To perform the state’s hegemonic masculinity, Trump also militarises the society. Drawing upon established gendered identities, the Trump administration evokes a series of securitising moves to militarise COVID-19.37 As early as 15 March, Trump argues that the United States ‘deployed over a thousand officers in support of the coronavirus missions’, reframing the pandemic not as an emergency managed by health professionals but one controlled by the military that will ‘defend our homeland during this crisis’. 38 In this framework, the nation’s military capabilities are constructed as a source of security, a physical reassertion of its masculinised control and dominance. Here, Trump touts the desirability of the military, stating that [o]ur great military is operating at 100 per cent during this crisis and thousands of troops are deployed alongside of civilians in the COVID hotspots, as you know. You see them all over. I spoke – when I spoke with Governor Cuomo, and when I spoke to Gavin Newsom, and many of the other governors, they wanted to know if we could have some military help with the medical, and we – we gave it to them.39 This quote presents the military as the masculinist protector of the nation with Governors jockeying for its aid while simultaneously framing it as a pervasive and saturating force who is ‘all over’. The military’s spreading encroachment across all vectors of society assures Trump’s audience of the United States’ ever-growing control over the virus, and in turn, paints the military as the reason for the nation’s success. As a result, Trump hails his response to the pandemic as ‘a tremendous victory’, ‘thanks to our all-out military operation and the extraordinary devotion of our people’ as ‘we believe we will experience far fewer deaths than even the optimistic projection’. 40 In tandem with the physical deployment of the military, Trump’s rhetoric is imbued with militarised references. Trump constructs the pandemic as a figurative battlefield, one that parallels ‘a World War, or a World War One or Two or something’ as it is ‘a war all unto itself’. 41 To align with this imagery, military hospitals are deployed to New York and Los Angeles, ‘frontline workers’ are reconceptualised as heroic, selfless soldiers falling in the line of duty, and even ordinary citizens are viewed as making their patriotic contribution to the nation by ‘fighting this battle from home’. 42 Not only does Trump construct the pandemic as an ‘all-out war’ but he places himself at the centre of society’s militarisation: ‘I’m a wartime president. This is a war. This is a war. A different kind of war that we’ve ever had.’ 43 Here, Trump figuratively takes control of all militarised activities intended to protect the population by using the personal pronoun ‘I’. As an extension of this militarised paternalism, Trump’s reluctance to count the casualties of this ‘war’ creates ambiguity and disillusionment that alters what Christine Sylvester calls the ‘perceptions of American war capabilities’. 44 Following this logic, Trump often refuses to broadcast the statistics of American mortality and case rates. However, when discussing these statistics discreetly, multiple members of Trump’s team utilise dehumanising tactics by referring to those who passed away from COVID-19 as having ‘expired’ – a term that more frequently refers to food past its due date rather than the loss of a citizen.45 Trump also deploys these discursive tactics to create a façade of militarised success that is further bolstered by notions of paternalistic protection as well as hegemonic and charismatic leadership. For instance, when prompted by reporters in multiple press briefings to discuss the number of cases, Trump belligerently dismisses their questions as ‘nasty’, ‘really bad reporting’, and ‘sensationalism’. 46 These discursive tactics expose Trump’s lack of transparency as an effort to give the American people a renewed sense of ‘hope’ and safeguard them from the brutal truth of ‘war’. 47 Once again, such militarised responses to the pandemic place Trump not only within the centrefold of controlling America’s military activities but also in the role of hegemonic protector. While Trump’s role as the nation’s protector rests upon his position as the Commander in Chief, his legitimation strategy also relies heavily on the United States’ economic capacity. Unlike his two predecessors, Trump’s reign has conjured a blatant reframing of previously exemplified American masculine norms. From George W. Bush’s indelible hyper-sexualised bravado48 to Barack Obama’s familial paternalism,49 Trump’s form of physical masculinity leaves much to be desired. As a result, the construction of Trump’s masculinity and, in the consortium, his legitimacy revolves not around his prominent physical characteristics but instead around his success as an entrepreneur.50 On multiple occasions, Trump draws on his economic success over the three years as president to demonstrate his capacity to rule. He states that ‘nobody has ever done anything like what we were able to do’ 51 and forcefully appropriates this achievement: I think you’re going to have a recovery. Look, I built – they were just telling me inside, and it’s fact – I built the greatest economy – with the help of 325 million people, I built the greatest economy in the history of the world. And one day, because of something that should have never been allowed to happen, we had to close our country, we had to close our economy.52 Such assertions portray Trump not only as a legitimate and successful leader of the United States but, more importantly, as the one responsible for maintaining its position as the economic powerhouse and global hegemon. As the latter quote exemplifies, Trump excessively utilises the first personal pronoun (‘I’), which allows him to embody the success of the nation. As the American economy slipped into one of the worst downturns since the Great Depression, Trump claims that ‘I had to turn it off in order to get to a point where we are today.’ 53 While claiming responsibility for the economic safety of the nation, Trump also assures his audience that Americans will ‘help countries around the world as well’ because ‘the whole world is watching’ them.54 The narrative of Trump’s leadership par excellence produces an image of the United States as the supreme leader in the fight against COVID-19, whereas other countries ‘aren’t highly sophisticated’ and represent failures.55 For example, Trump contrasts the United States’ rate of COVID-19 testing with that of other countries: We are way ahead on testing. We are the best in the world on testing. We’ve tested much more than anybody else, times two – or every country combined. We’ve tested more than every country combined. … The quality of our tests is the best and the number is the best.56 These multiple superlatives and assertions that the United States is ‘first’ on one or another measure enable Trump to reinforce a masculine fiction of conquest and triumph. In this framework, the pandemic becomes a platform for the United States to demonstrate and maintain its innovative capacity and supremacy. Similarly, other top-level members of Trump’s administration extend the narrative of American omnipotence. As a case in point, Mike Pompeo reminds the media that ‘a lot of countries are asking us for assistance and a lot of countries have received assistance’, assuring that the United States has ‘of course, done the right thing’. 57 However, he instantly highlights that the United States will be ‘an enormous force for good’ in other countries and regions only after it provides for itself: We’ve made sure we had the resources for our own people, but as the American greatness – as American power and American commercial prosperity continues to grow, we’re building out – we’re getting not only ventilators but all of the equipment that the world will need.58 While Trump and Pompeo make it clear that the United States will take care of itself first, they continue to represent the nation as the world’s saviour and protector of the weak. This notion is explicitly rhetorical. Although both figures elevate COVID-19 to a ‘global threat’, 59 it is clear that the United States is isolated. Rather than binding together as a universal front and leading the world to victory, Trump and his most prominent team members continually denounce the work of both other nations and international organisations, portraying the United States as individually successful in comparison. In turn, the fight against COVID-19 is framed not as a fight for global immunity and humankind but as a competition over who is going to defeat the threat first.

#### The dichotomy of gendered discourses used by Trump and Putin in their attempt to securitize COVID-19 normalize harmful gender stereotypes and roles, and normalize using toxic masculinity in response to a crisis

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The masculinity performed by Trump and Putin is toxic, inasmuch as it (re)produces and nourishes state-inspired nationalism and white supremacy. On the domestic level, their gendered securitisation discourses atomise American and Russian citizens, imposing on them subjugating features of a homogenous national ‘we’ and creating new exclusionary boundaries along the lines of race and ethnicity. As a case in point, Trump employs hegemonic discourses to reconceptualise the United States as a white, masculine entity. In stark terms, Trump’s gendering of the nation constructs fictionalised divisions between who belongs to the ‘we’ and who is framed as the excluded Other. These discourses not only formulate the pandemic as a health crisis but also elevate it to that of a racialised security threat, capable of compromising the purity of the United States. As for the Russian case, the brand of hegemonic masculinity reproduced by Putin normalises the racialisation of Russian nationalism and further anchors Russianness in its ethnic and religious terms. Moreover, Putin fosters paternalistic domination over women by rendering them as passive victims of the pandemic to be protected and guided. Both Trump and Putin elevate the COVID-19 outbreak to a global threat. However, while Trump turns his response to the pandemic into a competition that the United States is destined to win, Putin focuses on cooperation under collective responsibility. Trump wants the United States to get ahead of other countries. Putin claims that Russia will learn from other countries and analyse their experience carefully while setting an example of the proper ethical conduct for the rest of the world. As much as these two narratives are at odds with each other, they both create multiple dichotomies where Others are represented as subordinated to the national Self and thus are either feminine or hyper-masculine. In the case of feminisation, Others are presented as passive, weak, and poorly organised. Hyper-masculine Others are aggressive, irrational, egotistical, and competitive. Both are portrayed as dangerous and threatening to the international community at large. These tight hierarchical dichotomies normalise and fuel the great power confrontation and prevent the international community from engaging in a constructive dialogue and synergetic planning to respond to the pandemic. In both cases, political leaders enacted hierarchical gendered identities in the securitisation of COVID-19, sustaining their national manhoods and bolstering their legitimation strategy. A year down the road, it is evident that Trump’s and Putin’s illusionary projections of the ‘guardian of the nation’ did not translate into effective policy responses that alleviated the threat of COVID-19. Both the United States and Russia are among the top ten most affected countries by COVID-19 worldwide.96 For the United States, 2020 was the deadliest year in its history, with deaths associated with COVID-19 reaching 473,000.97 Russia officially recorded more than 358,000 excess deaths between April and December 2020,98 with almost 100 per cent of these deaths in some regions attributed to COVID-19.99 These numbers demonstrate that both Trump and Putin failed many of their citizens, letting the deadly virus run wild. However, bringing to the fore Trump’s and Putin’s convergent securitising discourses, we do not target the failure of their securitising moves. Rather, we problematise Trump and Putin’s deployment of masculinity as a tool in securitisation that led both leaders to dangerously exert hegemonic masculinity in times of uncertainty. In the United States, Trump dispelled contrasting emotions of fear and security to quell the pandemic’s threat to American sovereignty, invulnerability, and global dominance, while concurrently cementing his position as the nation’s protector. In Russia, Putin drew on the idealised heteronormative concept of the nuclear family to frame himself as the nation’s patriarch and legitimise his authoritarian regime. As such, the process of securitising is not uniform but instead socially and culturally specific. We do not argue that a resurgence of hegemonic masculinity is intrinsic to securitisation or that securitisation is simply a ploy used by all national leaders during a crisis to reassert their nation’s sovereignty. Yet, our findings show that both Trump and Putin – two very notable and influential politicians in the international arena, to say the least – virtually turn masculinity into the means of securitising COVID-19. Overall, studies as the one we present here demonstrate how implicit and explicit references to masculinity in the process of securitisation confirm it as the political norm and thus naturalise the systemic effects of toxic gendered practices that permeate both Trump’s and Putin’s quests for power.

### Cyberwar/cyberterror Link

#### Representations of cyberwar actively work to justify violent Otherizing lashouts via unnecessary fearmongering based on false data

**Rid 13,** [Thomas, reader in war studies at King's College London, author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place," "The Great Cyberscare," 3/13/13, [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the\_great\_cyberscare](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare)] Mr.Mr.

The White House likes a bit of threat. In his State of the Union address, Barack Obama wanted to nudge Congress yet again into passing meaningful legislation. The president emphasized that America's enemies are "seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic control systems." After two failed attempts to pass a cybersecurity act in the past two years, he added swiftly: "We cannot look back years from now and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our economy." Fair enough. A bit of threat to prompt needed action is one thing. Fear-mongering is something else: counterproductive. Yet too many a participant in the cybersecurity debate reckons that puffery pays off. The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat. The paper seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same." A reminder is in order: The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of the Pentagon document offer such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation in a self-respecting political science department. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After all a bit of fear helps to claim -- or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end. Mandiant's much-noted report linking a coordinated and coherent campaign of espionage attacks dubbed Advanced Persistent Threat 1, or "APT1," to a unit of the Chinese military is a case in point: The firm offered far more details on attributing attacks to the Chinese than the intelligence community has ever done, and the company should be commended for making the report public. But instead of using cocky and over-confident language, Mandiant's analysts should have used Words of Estimative Probability, as professional intelligence analysts would have done. An example is the report's conclusion, which describes APT1's work: "Although they control systems in dozens of countries, their attacks originate from four large networks in Shanghai -- two of which are allocated directly to the Pudong New Area," the report found. Unit 61398 of the People's Liberation Army is also in Pudong. Therefore, Mandiant's computer security specialists concluded, the two were identical: "Given the mission, resourcing, and location of PLA Unit 61398, we conclude that PLA Unit 61398 is APT1." But the report conspicuously does not mention that Pudong is not a small neighborhood ("right outside of Unit 61398's gates") but in fact a vast city landscape twice the size of Chicago. Mandiant's report was useful and many attacks indeed originate in China. But the company should have been more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence, as the computer security expert Jeffrey Carr and others have pointed out. The firm made it too easy for Beijing to dismiss the report. My class in cybersecurity at King's College London started poking holes into the report after 15 minutes of red-teaming it -- the New York Times didn't. Which leads to the next point: The media want to sell copy through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post should have reminded its readers that the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage -- Stuxnet -- was actually executed by the United States government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some of the evidential problems in the Mandiant report; instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. On issues of cybersecurity, the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the security establishment.

### Econ Link

#### Describing economic issues in existential frames militarizes the economy—results in structural inequalities and acts as a mental justification for war.

**Skilling 14** [3/1, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Management @ Auckland University of Technology, “Everyday Emergency: Crisis, Unease, and Strategy in Contemporary Political Discourse,” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#tabModule> retrieved 5/19/14] Mr.Mr.

Narratives of crisis often invoke the specter of existential, physical threats to the body of the nation such as terrorist threats (Huysmans and Buonfino [2008](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0040)); it is in this physical sense of security that Bigo ([2002](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0007), p. 63) notes that human migration is ‘increasingly interpreted as a security problem’. Importantly, however, the production of unease also draws on everyday and (especially) economic challenges in a competitive global economy. Indeed, key aspects of contemporary economic life (tax and welfare regimes, productivity and innovation, and employment law, for instance) are increasingly interpreted as problems of national security. In the realm of immigration policy, for instance, national security no longer simply requires keeping out the dangerous, the poor and the sick. Rather, national security is also achieved by actively attracting and retaining desired, ‘talented’ migrants. Hence the contention of the Singaporean Prime Minister (cited in Ong [2006](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0056), p. 188) that the successful attraction of ‘foreign talent will be a matter of life and death’ for the nation, where he clearly had in mind not the physical security but the continued economic viability of the nation. As Ong ([2006](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0056), p. 5) suggests, the state of exception occasioned by neoliberalism ‘can be deployed to include as well as to exclude’ (emphasis mine).¶ Economic viability within a global economy is thus increasingly constructed as a matter of national security problem. As Agamben ([2005](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0002), p. 13) notes, while the idea of the state of emergency was normalized during World War I, after the war, ‘military emergency … ceded its place to economic emergency’. The key discursive move in constructing economic viability as an issue of national security is the application of the metaphor of war to economic challenges. Agamben ([2005](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0002)) cites Franklin D. Roosevelt’s response to the Great Depression (‘I shall ask the Congress … for broad Executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe’ (p. 22)) to ground his claim that ‘the metaphor of war [became] an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary’ (p. 21). The metaphor of war is deployed within a narrative of constant crisis in which national economies are engaged in an unending global contest for resources, trade access and investment. As we shall see, the challenges of neoliberal globalization are not constructed primarily as crises of environmental degradation or political sovereignty, but – overwhelmingly – as a pervasive crisis of economic competitiveness.¶ The state-at-war metaphor is one of the main ways in which an economically based ‘shared purpose’ is naturalized and used to suppress alternative conceptions (Skilling [2011](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0047), p. 78). It is during times of war that the state can most easily call for an almost endless degree of loyalty and sacrifice in the name of a clearly defined shared objective. It is during times of war that it becomes most acceptable to ask what citizens can do for their country, and to recognize and reward them on that basis. And, in a context of permanent crisis, the criteria of individual contribution to national viability can be used to justify massive inequalities of outcome.¶ Neoliberalism, then, can be understood as a mode of ‘governing through freedom’ that institutes the danger and uncertainty that lies at the far side of that freedom. And within a neoliberal global economy, the external environment is constructed as a fluid and potentially hostile realm of opportunity and challenge. The pursuit of global economic competitiveness, in turn, is justified as the urgently necessary response to that danger and uncertainty: as the salve for unease. It is thus essential to its legitimacy that the state is seen as offering a credible and coordinated response to that challenging environment. Far from eroding state power, neoliberalism provides the conditions that enhance the status and legitimacy of the state (and other actors) as the producer and implementer of strategy (see Thrift [2000](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0014), p. 95), even if that strategy stipulates a decreased scope of direct governmental action or control. As Kim McKee ([2009](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0040), p. 469) notes, ‘less direct government in society does not necessarily entail less governing.’ In neoliberalism’s recasting of politics as a ‘problematizing activity’ and its ‘transforming [of] situations of uncertainty into calculative strategies’ (Ong [2006](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19460171.2013.862504#CIT0056), p. 178), a dialectic emerges between problems and strategies. Problems call forth a ‘necessary’ strategic response; strategy produces correlative problems. The practice of strategy validates and empowers those experts able to formulate, implement and assess the technical solutions that the discourses of crisis, risk, unease and (in)security require.

### Environment Link

#### **Securitizing the environment via the aff’s Western scientific discourse ignores structural issues in the environment – masculine domination over nature is the root cause, which makes the kritik prerequisite.**

Breidlid 13 [Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 23-25]Mr.Mr.

Philipp Pattberg (2007) discusses the ideology of domination over nature that is still with us today, how it is “|d]eeply rooted in our every-day beliefs, actions, reflections and hopes, it lies at the center of any attempt to transform the world into a more loveable, friendlier, lighter and safer place” (p. 7). By discussing what he terms the enslavement of nature and the enslavement of humans by other humans, he concludes that this has led to a global state which is not sustainable. Exploring its historical trajectory, the ideology of domination over the natural environment took hold, according to Pattberg, “in the context of . . . the decline of Christianity as a total explanatory structure for human existence, the scientific turn of Cartesianism and the rise of capitalism to a self-replicating structure of rational choice” (p. 8). Lynn White (1974) suggests that the ecological crisis is due to the orthodox Christian legacy, especially its Western branch, stating, “Christian- ity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia’s religions (except, perhaps Zorastrianism), not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is Cod’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends” (p. 4). Moreover, White proposes that “(o]ur science and technology have grown out of Christian attitudes towards man’s relation to nature which are almost universally held, not only by Christians and neo-Chris- tians but also by those who fondly regard themselves as post-Christians” (p. 5). Interestingly, White suggests a return to unorthodox Christianity spearheaded by St. Francis, an idea I will return to later in this book. Max Weber’s thesis, 7he Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism (1905/2001), is based on the assumption that there is a close relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, that capitalism’s basis is (what was interpreted as) the Christian work ethic, particularly in Calvinism. The idea is that domination over nature through hard work and frugality will be rewarded by God. There is therefore an important epistemological dimension to this crisis. As Kincheloe and Steinberg (2008) put it, “Some indigenous educators and philosophers put it succinctly: We want to use indigenous knowledge to counter Western’s science destruction of the Earth. Indigenous knowledge can facilitate the 21st century project because of its tendency to focus on relationships of human beings to both one another and to their eco-system” (pp. 136-137). The exclusion of alternative epistemologies and the privileging of rational science have meant the demise of ecological sustainability while the epitomization of scientific truth and rationality has excluded values that transcend the so-called rationality dogma of the West. This denial of epistemological diversity and the privileging of European epistemic mono-culture is still hegemonic and perceived as a sign of development and modernity. Ideological Pathology There is a naive belief among modernization theoreticians that since ecological problems are a result of the economic activities of modernization, further economic activities should cure these environmental problems. Due to the finiteness of the earth’s resources, the vicious circle of repair- ing the consequences of progress with further progress is not sustainable. Ronald Wright (2004) argues that the 20lh century was a period where unlimited growth in terms of population, consumption, and technology exploited the natural systems in an unsustainable way. Wright calls these activities of ecological unsustainability the very worst kind of “ideologi- cal pathology.” While colonialism and the capitalist world system have been beset with territorial, political, and economic conquest, Western science is based on the same idea of conquest, that is, not respecting the earth’s ecological limits. Moreover, in line with worid-systems analysis, there is an ecologi- cal unequal exchange here, as the core’s exploitation and utilization of the world’s resources is matched in the periphery with the burden of negative ecological costs imposed by the core. As has been discussed above, the issue of Western science and knowledge production is existentially important because the Eurocentric epistemology of knowing (mastering) and dominating the world is, despite its mer- its, dramatically problematic in a world where the majority of the world’s population not only suffers from hunger and malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of work, but where the hegemonic epistemology upsets the relationship between [people] man and nature as it seeks to possess the earth in the same way as a master exploits his slave. The ecological challenges are closely intertwined with the current economic challenges in the West, and it is difficult to ignore that the aggressive ideology of exploitation and the maximizing of profits, which are so central to European hegemonic epistemology, is detrimental to the efforts to save the planet from ecological disaster. Vivas (2011) is right when contending that the difference between the present economic crisis and those of the 1970s and 1929 is “its ecological aspect. Indeed, we cannot analyze the global ecological crisis separately from the crisis in which we are immersed or the critique of the economic model that has led us into it.” Even if we do not agree that the crisis is due to capitalism’s inherent contradictions, the global economic crisis has long been there; the eco- nomic crises in Greece, Italy, and Spain are miniscule compared to the permanent crises in the South, where millions go hungry to bed every day and live on a dollar per day despite heavy interventions from the aid com- munities in the West/North. Even though economic hegemony is shifting to Asia (China and India) and Latin America (Brazil), there is no reason to believe that the hegemonic discourse of resource exploitation and profit maximization will change. On the contrary, China’s economic growth is based on the same Eurocentric discourse, and the ecological challenges in China are, as a consequence, enormous, not only for China, but for the world as a whole. Its emission of greenhouse gases is the highest (in volume) in the world. There is a shortage and pollution of water. Annual desertification of land amounts to an area of about 13000 sq km (the size of Connecticut), and economic growth and rapid development mean “increasing urbanization, consumerism, and pol- lution’' (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). The failures of past climate summits in Copenhagen (December 2009), Cancun (December 2010), and Durban (December 2011) show the inertia of the governments in wealthy countries. Actually, there is no global leader- ship to fend off the ecological crisis, simply because the leaders of wealthy countries are entrenched in an economic system that prioritizes non-sus- tainable development. There seems to be no willingness or ability to find a solution that requires a comprehensive social and economic transforma- tion, such as the necessity to decrease consumption levels in the North (given that similar consumption levels across the globe would require sev- eral planets). Here there is no difference between Communist China (a capi- talist in economic matters) and the US. This is one important reason why “the critique of the epistemic foundations of Western academic discourse has triggered and nourished discussions on the possibilities of construction of an alternative to capitalism” (Santos et a!., 2008, p. xxxiv). It was the universalist claims of Europe’s hegemonic epistemology (as discussed earlier in the chapter) that was employed to justify Europe’s “civi- lizing mission,” which is still hegemonic globally. As Griffiths and Knezevic (2009) state: This scientific universalism, the most recent manifestation of European universal ism, asserts objectivity across all phenomena and time . . . Such claims of universalism, or assertions of universal truths, function as meta-narratives that encapsulate the ideology of those groups with power in the world-system . . . (pp. 67-68).

### Facial Recognition Link

#### AI is used as an apparatus of domination due to data that will always construct power relations via rendering women and minorities invisible because its data is not representative of the entire population

**Aradau and Bunz 2022** (Claudia Aradau, Professor of International Politics at King’s College London and a member of the editorial collective of Radical Philosophy. Mercedes Bunz, Reader in Digital Culture and Society at the Department of Digital Humanities, King’s College London, and an editor of the Open Access meson press. Her work explores the digital transformation of knowledge, and its effect on power. Radical Philosophy Issue 212, “Dismantling the apparatus of domination? Left critiques of AI”)

The critique of power addresses AI as an apparatus of domination and traces the technology through the production of data – data collected by corporations thriving in so-called ‘platform capitalism’ as well as by the state and its repressive agencies. Power emerges in multiple forms, from the historicity of data, its extraction by corporations and the state, its valorisation and the effects of surveillance and oppression it creates. What statisticians and computer scientists refer to as bias is created by training data reflecting historical or social inequities. When gathering training data, specific groups – such as people of colour, minorities or women – are often underrepresented. They might have been overlooked in the process of data sampling or during the testing of the AI technology. This ‘prototypical whiteness’ that renders racialised subjects invisible is entwined with surveillance technologies that render them hypervisible, as Simone Browne has shown.15 For example, a dataset called‘Faces in the Wild’, which had long been considered as a benchmark for testing facial recognition software, now comes with the warning that its data is not representative – 70% of the faces are male and 80% white, as digital activist Joy Buolamwini found out.16 And even if values representing race, gender, sexual orientation or class are removed, AI models, always looking for patterns, turn to proxy discrimination using statistical correlations of postcodes, education or particular expressions to discriminate. As Wendy Chun pointed out in her study Discriminating Data: ‘These “errors” often come from “ignoring” race – that is, wrongly assuming that race-free equals racism-free’.17

### “Great Powers” Link

#### Traditional IR sees small states and those on the margins as irrelevant, prioritizing “great powers” over and silencing violence against women and other minorities.

Sjoberg 2013 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida. *Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War* (Print Book)) CL

* This card has a bunch of stuff in it and it can be recut to make any of those args

In addition to having a narrow conception of what states’ relationships are, the literature on dyadic causes of war often focuses on a narrow subset of states that have relationships. While much of the quantitative work on dyadic causes of war includes either all dyads or all politically relevant dyads,20 many of the case studies look at great powers, and most of them do not dig significantly deeper than the (assumed rational, unitary) governments of those great states. By contrast, feminist analyses have come to see individual welfare rather than great power stability or even how governments interact as a central factor in global politics. The security of the least powerful women in the least powerful states in the world is not only a key security issue for feminists but also a key unit of analysis, given that many feminists see the margins as a crucial and inseparable part of local, global, and international politics. Feminist research shows how those at the political margins can be made insecure even while states are being made more secure. Women’s bodies have been considered the means to an end in debates over the U.S. security force in South Korea, the prevalence of and possible solutions to AIDS, and debates about refugee camp composition and makeup, to name a few, at the state and system level.21 Research into women’s lives in war and conflict has shown that they are often made insecure when military operations cut off households’ access to food, water, or electricity; when soldiers rape them; when crime and “domestic” violence increases as a result of war; and when severe economic deprivation leaves them vulnerable to disease.22 These threats are often, both statistically and existentially, more vicious than the threat of great power war.23 Feminist work has demonstrated a link between what happens to women in wars and the gendered dynamics of the making and fighting of wars.24 Because feminists often see individual security as a central issue in global politics, their work has critiqued the hierarchy that many liberal approaches to war(s) identify and espouse in global politics. Feminists have recognized that the least fortunate and the least free in global politics are often the people whose needs are neglected by policy decision makers and policy analysts.25 Additionally, “feminist scholars have repeatedly shown that gender operates at various levels at which it intersects with class, ethnicity, race, nationality, and sexuality to produce and reproduce an intricate web of inequalities between and among men and women.”26 Feminist theory, then, is critical of social and political hierarchy for the pressure that it puts on the “bottom” of that hierarchy.27 Many dyadic theories of war, like many system-level theories of war, do not share feminist theorists’ interests in identifying, critiquing, and deconstructing hierarchies in and among states.28 Instead, I argue that dyad-trait accounts of war value hierarchy by valuing the domestic organization of states (and how that organization affects peoples’ lives) as a means to the end of interstate peacefulness without particular regard for how what happens inside the state affects the people inside the state. Some “mainstream” war theorists concede that those left out of the planning of the international system “consider the system to be unfair, corrupt, biased, skewed, and dominated by hostile forces” but often do not give significant attention to the possibility that such a perception is true and normatively problematic.29 Feminist work has provided critiques both of the narrow definition of power (as domination)30 and the narrow view of whose power and security matters in these accounts. Arguing that it is possible to recognize through gender lenses the normative value and empirical impact of lives on the margins of international security, much feminist work looks for alternative ways to analyze war. This is important because, as Fiona Robinson notes, “those who care for others, and those who are most in need of care, are among the world’s most marginalized people.”31 While some characterize small powers as irrelevant because they “pose no threat to the dominant nation’s leadership in the international system,”32 many feminist perspectives express concern that this view justifies political and social oppression for the good of peace among great powers. Likewise, while some would ignore the concerns of the weak within states, because they do not make decisions or change policies directly, many feminist scholars have seen such a move as not only empirically problematic but also discriminatory: A concept of national security which gives priority to military threat rather than to dangers in the economic and social sectors of society can be bought only at the cost of poverty and misery and the violation of human rights—a cost borne by all poor people but especially by women and future generations.33 As referenced above and discussed in more detail in chapter 9, wars tend to have a number of gendered and sex-differential impacts in a number of areas, including direct material destruction, the implications of infrastructural damage, interactions with patriarchal militaries, the fallout of economic downturn, and the problems associated with environmental destruction.34 These harms are often distributed disproportionately on the basis of not only sex but also race and class to the margins of societies,35 and those people’s suffering is often ignored in dyadic and state-level war theorizing. Feminist theorizing, on the other hand, often looks for what happens at the margins.

### LAWs Link

#### An Artificial intelligence weapon is the gold standard for hegemonic masculinity—free of vulnerability

**Roff 16** (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)

Jean Elshtain (1987) notes that the narrative of men as “Just Warriors” and women as “Beautiful Souls” does not “denote what men and women really are in time of war, but function[s] instead to re-create and secure women’s location as noncombatants and men’s [location] as warriors” (4). Identifying this “trope” is one way to see the power of gender hierarchies and to question and break down that power relation. The masculine male as ideal solider, the feminine female as ideal noncombatant (innocent, victim, powerless) is something we should, and have more recently started to, question in practice.1 Indeed, with the United States repealing its exclusion of women for direct combat roles (United States Department of Defense 2013), one might hope that breaking down the gender hierarchies is on the horizon. However, as one hand gives, another takes away. While women are now de jure permitted to engage in combat roles, and thus all roles in warfighting, there is another movement afoot which threatens this process of gender balancing and mainstreaming: the creation of humanoid robotics. While some might view the creation of autonomous robotic warfighters as emancipatory, potentially freeing the military of gendered practices, I argue that this viewpoint is incorrect. Rather, the creation of humanoid robot fighters further entrenches a hegemonic masculinity that subordinates all humans. **The humanoid robot fighter is the ideal of masculinity in western culture, for it represents an “independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual and rational ”being free from any weakness, particularly irrationality, frailty, emotion or desires** (Barrett 2001, 79). The article traces three potential avenues for the construction of gender in a “warbot,” or humanoid robot warfighter. First, I look to hardware, or the physical constructions of humanoid robots. I utilize the United States Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s (DARPA) Robotics Challenge as current evidence of these physical design choices (and potential trajectory for future designs).2 Second, I look to the naming of these systems, as well as their intended roles. I argue that the way research teams currently name and task these systems perpetuates and reifies gendered roles and power hierarchies. I caution that without a critical examination on the part of researchers and engineers, the current practice may lead to an accretion of gendered practices that threatens inclusion and mainstreaming. Third and finally, I look to the software of a potential humanoid robotic warfighter. Using feminist critiques of the philosophy of science, epistemology, technology and artificial intelligence (AI), I argue that the AIs created will not only emulate and/or co-opt the biases of their creators, but that the creators will actually distill gender into hegemonic masculinities and femininities for these machines. Taken together, these three gender vectors will produce an **artificially intelligent, artificially gendered, lethal autonomous humanoid robot**. Instead of using technology to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies, a` la Haraway’s (1990) conception of the post-human cyborg, this machine will perpetuate domination and subordination.

#### AI weapons are gendered to become an archetype for “warrior virtues” and embody hegemonic masculinity as it paints humanity as vulnerable, and thus feminine

**Roff 16** (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)

Finally, and the most likely reason for intended gendering of AI, the purpose of gender is to reconstitute the gendered practices of the sending state’s military. As militarized masculinity is well known, the construction of a masculinized robot would act as an archetype for other human soldiers. The warbot would embody all of the “warrior virtues” and would surpass all of its human compatriots because it would never fatigue, require food, sleep or suffer from the trauma of war.23 As Goldstein (2001) points out, suppressing emotions, shaming and refusing to acknowledge wartime trauma are consistent practices across cultures to socialize men to war. A gendered warbot would act asa norm generator, and militaries, instead of trying to mold human soldiers to suppress their human tendencies by denying their physical limits through training, shaming and abuse, can instead create machines that embody all of these qualities. The humanoid robot fighter does not sleep, is “rational” in its calculations, is aggressive and can fight in the most dangerous of situations. It is Barrett’s (2001) vision of hegemonic masculinity in military culture. The result is that all humans become subordinated as weak, incapable and emotional; that is, feminized. One may object here and claim that all I have shown is that the creation of gendered humanoid robots perpetuates militarized masculinity. In a way, this is certainly true. Recall that Harding (2011) observes the mutually dependent relationship between the military and science/technology/engineering is coconstituted. If the producers and consumers of the technology co-constitute one another, then they will perpetuate already existing gendered practices. Humans gender because they are gendered. However, if I am correct, and the first-generation robots in the DRC portend a future of gendered autonomous warbots, then those machines will be hypermasculinized AIs in oversexed bodies. **Technology is not going to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies,** as Haraway (1990) suggests, **but will instead reify those very practices and power relationships.** I have suggested here that no human warfighter will be capable of living up to the standard set by these machines. To be sure, many of the “warrior virtues” are idealized, and human warriors often fall short of those standards. Humans will always be subject to the realities of fatigue, limitations of physical strength, hunger and emotion. Yet creating gendered autonomous machines entails that those machines will always live up to the ideal, and humans can never (and have never) met those standards. “Virtues” will not be “excellences” any longer; rather they will be the standard behavior for warbots. In turn, **this will solidify a version of hegemonic masculinity, and further factionalize and subordinate all other masculinities and femininities.** Thus I agree with Manjikan (2013) when she worries that “autonomous technologies might actually prove harmful to both genders” (12).

### NATO Link

#### Fear of feminization structures NATO with masculine ideals.

Hebert 11, (Laura Hebert, Analyzing UN and NATO responses to Sexual Misconduct in Peacekeeping Operations, published in *Making Gender, Making war*. Laura Hebert is an associate professor of Diplomacy and World Affairs at the Occidental College.) *GP*

NATO’s approach to gender mainstreaming is just as superficial as that of the UN. In the early 1960s, senior female service officers from NATO countries began meeting to discuss how women could be more effectively integrated and utilized in NATO forces. Their efforts eventually led the Military Committee (MC), NATO’s highest military authority, to establish a consultative committee in 1976 with the purpose of facilitating information sharing between NATO members on the representation of female military personnel and issues affecting women’s ability to perform effectively in the armed forces (Garcia 1999). The Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) met formally only once a year, for a maximum of five working days (NATO 2007b: 8). Nonetheless, for twenty years it was the only body in the organization directly addressing women’s roles and status. In 1997, the MC agreed to create the Office on Women in NATO Forces (OWINF), run by two staff members, in order to allow for greater continuity in NATO’s support for the integration of women (Garcia 1999). The establishment of these bodies was the result of many years of hard work by women serving in NATO’s armed forces. The CWINF and the OWINF, however, focused not on gender mainstreaming, but rather on the integration of women in NATO forces through increasing the representation of female military personnel, ensuring female military personnel enjoy the same personal and professional opportunities as their male colleagues, and improving the quality of life of female personnel.34 In May 2009, the MC made the decision to replace the CWINF with the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective, while the OWINF was renamed the NATO Office on Gender Perspective. According to the MC, these changes were made to support the organization’s objective of integrating ‘the gender perspective into all aspects of NATO operations,’ in line with Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (NATO 2009). The responsibilities of these bodies now include facilitating information sharing on gender mainstreaming within NATO, among NATO members, and between NATO and other relevant international organizations and agencies; providing advice and support on gender mainstreaming to the MC; and gathering information on the progress of member states in implementing Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (NATO 2009). The changes made, however, appear to have greater symbolic than practical significance. Like the bodies they replaced, the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives meets once annually for a maximum of five working days, while the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives is run by only two staff members, one of whom is an administrative assistant rather than a gender specialist. As with its anti-trafficking policy, the limited dedicated support the NATO leadership has directed to these gender mainstreaming bodies inevitably constrains their ability to have a substantive impact on NATO policies, planning priorities, and operations. From a feminist constructivist perspective, there is nothing surprising about the failure of the UN and NATO to go beyond a surface approach to gender mainstreaming in the security arena, even when these institutions (particularly the UN) position themselves as women’s rights standard-setters. Although International Relations scholars have made clear that states are not ‘black boxes’ that are uniform across time and place, common markers nonetheless distinguish states from other political entities, including their ability to harness the resources to wage war and preserve peace (Tilly 1990: 12). Prior to the mid-20th century, sovereign statehood was guaranteed only for those states that possessed the capacity to defend their sovereignty. Following World War II, however, sovereign statehood was granted to states through international recognition, whether or not they were fully capable in the modern sense (Jackson 1990). Since the period of decolonization, rapid militarization has occurred throughout the global South, attributable less to the practical urgency of state survival and more to global environmental processes and pressures that have come to define the symbols of legitimate statehood. Militaries, as described by Eyre and Suchman, ‘no longer build modern nations, but rather, the world political and social system builds modern nation-states, which in turn build modern militaries and procure modern weaponry’ (1996: 82). Military systems have not remained static. They have adapted to changing domestic and international environmental pressures and circumstances, including the shifting nature of security threats and technological developments that have altered strategic calculations and recruitment needs. But what largely remains unchanged is that military systems continue to function as ‘muscular,’ virile, masculine symbols of state power, irrespective of women’s gradual integration into armed forces (Peterson 1992: 48 and 2010: 23-24). Thus, for organizations such as the UN and NATO that rely on member states for their military capacity, to take 135 gender and gender mainstreaming into account is to threaten the military institutions that have been constructed as emblematic of sovereign statehood and substantive membership in the international society of states – a move inevitably resisted by their constituent states. Even with the rise of robust Chapter VII missions, peacekeeping continues to be characterized as a softer form of military power, with contemporary operations mainly requiring soldiers to perform a peace support rather than combat role. Although peacekeeping forces may serve a function distinct from national military systems, peacekeeping is ultimately inseparable from traditional militaries. Given the human and financial constraints facing most military systems, creating and training peacekeeping forces detached from military contingents serving national security interests is not a feasible option (Dandeker and Gow 2004: 12). Even in countries where the threat of inter-state war is remote, the priority is placed on preparing soldiers for the potential of combat situations and then ‘training down’ in order to ‘cater to the needs of missions in which a more restrained use of force is appropriate’ (Sorenson and Wood 2005: 11). Nonetheless, concerns persist among military leaders that the ‘peacekeeping ethos’ will filter into national military systems and erode combat capabilities (Boëne et al. 2004: 416). The failure of political and military leaders to take gender seriously in the security arena is thus neither the result of accidental oversight or lack of appreciation of the complexity of gender construction. Rather, attempts to penetrate military systems and culture in order to deepen the gender justice norm and prevent gendered exploitation continue to be frustrated by the fear of feminization – the fear at the heart of concerns that the peacekeeping ethos will taint national military systems. To expose the gender norms that inform (and are informed by) militarism is to exacerbate the perceived threat participation in peacekeeping missions poses to national military strength and preparedness. The norm of gender justice has sufficiently penetrated the security arena such that it can’t be ignored or overtly rejected, thus the recognition by the UN and NATO that their reputations and operational effectiveness are damaged by allegations of sexual misconduct. It can, however, be co-opted through the adoption of policies that invoke the appropriate language and give the impression of substantive change but which instead blunt its transformative potential. As long as the fundamental association between security threats, military capacity, and the masculine soldier ideal persists, we can expect that gender mainstreaming will continue to take the form of integrating women into already-defined masculine structures and efforts to address peacekeeper sexual misconduct will remain palliative rather than preventive.

### Nukes Link

#### Nuclear discourse is rooted in masculine language- the nuclear debate reinforces masculinity as an arms race becomes the masculinized concept of a “pissing contest”

Cecire 09, (Ruth Cecire, Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65, Feminist Studies, Inc., <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40607923>) GP

Cohn reports that because of the constant need to prove one's manhood, a sexualized discourse, veritable verbal "pissing contests," served to obscure any personal vulnerability or concern about lives lost; to do so risked being ostracized and demeaned as "soft," a "pussy," or for "acting like a wimp," which is, in their eyes, femalelike. Concern that Russians were essentially "harder" permeated strategic discussions, while, at the same time, new entrants to the nuclear club were said to have lost their virginity. It is thus hardly surprising to learn that when Edward Teller communicated news of the first successfully detonated hydrogen bomb, his telegram exclaimed, "It's a boy." Extant customary weapons still reflect a time-honored masculine iconography. Like arrows and guns, conventional and nuclear bombs evoke clearly discernible phallic imagery; the power and immediacy of their impact connote a masculine orgasmic event

### Prolif Link/Root Cause

#### The possession of nuclear weapons goes back to the drive to exert dominance.

**Agarwalla 20** [Yashna Agarwalla, “The Gendered Dimensions of Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policy,” <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/09/28/the-gendered-dimensions-of-anti-nuclear-weapons-policy/>, 2020 ***WE DO NOT ENDORSED GENDERED LANGUAGE IN THIS CARD***] Mr.Mr.

Nuclear weapons are, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the most dangerous invention of mankind, and a fierce resistance to their proliferation remains at the very crux of the international security architecture. Nuclear weapons have also given rise to waves of anti-nuclear activism since their very invention, particularly during the Cold War years. One of the most significant debates surrounding anti-nuclear activism and the disarmament movement contends itself with gender. Nuclear weapons are seen to symbolise strength and the power of a particular state. Nuclear weapons are, thus, embedded in notions of masculinity and this perceived connection between masculinity and weapons of mass destruction serves as a hurdle to their abolishment. For instance, the naming of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as ‘Little boy’ and ‘Fat man’ respectively opened the door for masculine characteristics to be associated with nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, after India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998, a prominent Indian politician remarked that the tests were necessary to prove ‘we are not eunuchs’ (Perlik, 2018). This statement aptly captures the high societal value and status awarded to nuclear weapons and brings to light how disarmament is seen as an affront to masculine norms and is hence feminine and weak.

### Transnational Organizations Link

#### Transnational organizations uniquely create a form of Hegemonic Masculinity

Connell 05, (RW Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinities, RW Connell was formerly a professor at the University of Sydney and an Australian sociologist)GP

( 1) Transnational and multi-national corporations, which typically have a strong gender division of labour, and a strongly masculinized management culture (Wajcman 1 999) . (2) The international state, including the institutions of diplomacy and UN agencies. These too are gendered, mainly run by men, though with more cultural complexity than multi-national corporations (Gierycz 1999) . (3) International media, which have a strong gender division of labour and powerfully circulate gender meanings through entertainment, advertising and news. New media participate in the commodification of women in an international trade in v.ives and sexual partners (Cunneen and Stubbs 2000 ) . (4) Global markets - in capital, commodities, services and labour - have an increasing reach into local economies. They are often strongly gender-structured (e.g. Chang and Ling 2000) , and are now very weakly regulated, apart from border controls on migration.

### Saviourism Link

#### Aff the engages in media framing that sees NATO as the savoir of Women as a alibi to western intervention, as seen in NATO bombing response in the Kosovo conflict

(Kozol 04, Wendy. , Wendy Kozol is a professor in the American Studies department at Oberlin College , “Domesticating NATO’s War in Kosovo/a: (In) Visible Bodies and the Dilemma of Photojournalism.” Meridians, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 1–38. JSTOR, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/40338878. Accessed 22 Jun. 2022](http://www.jstor.org/stable/40338878.%20Accessed%2022%20Jun.%202022).) // RB

Media Coverage of NATO Bombings Throughout the 1990s, the American news media represented the Balkans as a violent region rocked by ethnic cleansing following the collapse of communist regimes at the end of the Cold War. Reports on concentration camps, torture, mass murder, and expulsion of thousands from their homes reinforced a narrative about the failure of democracies rather than the failure of market economies to emerge. Moreover, by mid-decade, reporters began to discuss the extraordinarily high levels of sexual violence by Serbian and Yugoslav forces in this region, especially in Bosnia. Feminist analyses foreground the associations between Serbian national- ism, rape warfare, and ethnic cleansing in order to understand rape as a military and political tool (Milic 1993; B. Allen 1996; Rejali 1998). Lynda Boose, for instance, argues that the sexual sadism of Serbian brutality was crucial to this "orgy of nationalism" (2002, 74). Statistics vary widely but conservative estimates of women raped in Bosnia range from twenty thousand to fifty thousand. (Boose 2002) U.S. media attention turned to Kosovo/a in the late 1990s as violence escalated against Albanian Muslim populations. The moment of most intense interest in the region came during the NATO bombings when the United States was directly involved in the conflict through its military presence. NATO operations never achieved the popular support of the Gulf War, coming as they did shortly after the impeachment hearings of President Clinton. Instead, the bomb- ings provoked intense debates about appropriate methods of humanitarian intervention as well as exposed the problematic nature of NATO's very existence after 1991.

Television, newspapers, and the major newsmagazines all provided extensive coverage of the war. Even with the pervasiveness of television, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News continue to influence a wide variety of Americans because "nearly every high school, public and academic library" purchases them (Ulrich's Periodical Directory 2003). Major media con- glomerates that own Time (Time-Warner) and Newsweek (Washington Post, Inc.) - U.S. News is independently published - are part of the powerful network of American and European news media that control "what much of the world reads, watches, and hears in its foreign news ..." (Shulman 1994, 108). Crucially, these newsmagazines frame global economic, political, and social conflicts through racial and gender categories that in turn justify the U.S. government's encroaching and imperialist notions of globalization.

The first two weeks of the bombings in April 1999 were a crucial period during which the news magazines established narrative conventions for reporting the bombings. The first week's coverage featured lengthy discussions of U.S. military and political strategies, as well as articles on Milosevic as the locus of nationalist violence and reports on ethnic cleansing. Photographs show U.S. military and political leaders, Milosevic, maps of the region that depict US/NATO strategies for attack, and some pictures of refugees. Coverage in the second week focused more exten- sively on the refugees with numerous photographs of people walking along roads or railroad tracks and in the camps, photographs of military and political leaders, as well as more maps and pictures of U.S. soldiers. Articles continued to focus primarily on U.S. and NATO policies and military strategies, although reporters included more discussion of Albanian Kosovars' experiences of Serbian brutality.

Visual culture scholars are increasingly exploring the power of the visual to shape and mediate knowledge beyond simplistic models of propaganda or image manipulation (Liss 1998, xviii). Frequently reproduced and revered photographs of war, like Robert Capa's "Death of a Loyalist Soldier" (1936) or Nick Ut's "Terror of War" (the 1973 photograph of a young Vietnamese girl running naked from a Napalm attack) are not those with the most detail but those with the greatest symbolic value (Griffin 1999). As Liss writes, "At stake are the ways in which photographs are set in motion, how they are employed to stand in for wrenching, almost unrepresentable events" (1998, xii). This study provides detailed visual analyses of news photographs in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report to examine which photographs "stand in" or represent the bombing campaign. Because of publishing deadlines, weekly news- magazines function like a "news digest" that recapitulates television and newspaper reports on events of the previous week, using photographs as visual "highlights" (Griffin and Lee 1995, 814). These visual highlights are less important as factual reportage than they are for their symbolic function. I will analyze the similarities in topics of coverage, narrative strategies, and visual conventions, including some repetition of specific photographs.7 This article, however, does not address the interpretive audiences of these news reports, whose readings, of course, will always be plural.8

All three magazines promoted a narrative of American rescue of victims in a dangerous and unstable region.9 An April 12 photograph from US News, for instance, shows a white American soldier in full combat gear in the extreme foreground. He frames the picture so that the viewer looks with him into the background at several cars on a desolate road. The viewer thus "sees" what the soldier is there to protect (presumably these are civilian refugees although the people in the cars remain unidentified). Above the photograph, the headline "Can the Cavalry Ride to the Rescue?" aligns a racial ideal of hegemonic masculinity with U.S. military efforts in this visual rescue narrative. Although the question mark suggest ambiguity in the situation, the exclusive focus in the article on the relative merits of different military strategies raises questions about policy rather than social or ethical concerns. This tag line, moreover, invokes American narratives of the frontier, referencing the imperialist imaginary of the U.S. cavalry protecting white settlers from dangerous Indians. Here, the picture and the tag line connect whiteness and masculinity to the rescue narrative through a mythic temporality in which social actors enact historically defined roles (Fabian 1983).

The three newsmagazines reported on U.S. military and political leaders, military technology and strategies, and the political debates over the utility of air strikes. Other NATO political leaders were rarely dis- cussed, with only occasional references to the military capabilities of the allied countries.10 Reporters paid little attention to the reasons for the conflict, except to blame the violence on the nationalist ambitions of Milosevic, whom one U.S. official referred to as the "tinhorn dictator of Serbia" (Time April 5, 40). Like discussions of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War (Shohat 1994), the U.S. news media focused almost exclusively on the national leader, turning this conflict into a personalized fight against the excessive evils of nationalism. News reports described him as a dictator, a thug, a communist party hack, and a man of no political convictions except to stay in power. Feminist scholars have challenged representations of the Balkan conflicts that focus solely on individual leaders through documentation of the collective and localized dimensions of ethnic/political violence. Mertus (1999a) and Boose (2002), for instance, offer analyses of how the gender and sexual rhetorics of Serbian national- ism played into and exacerbated local ethnic tensions and conflicts.

Instead of more complex historical analyses, news narratives typically provide American viewers with an easily identified enemy, a narrative of us/ them frequently structured on racial logics. This news strategy is apparent once again in George W. Bush's "war on terrorism," which initially focused almost exclusively on Osama bin Laden as the leader of Al Qaeda. When the U.S. military failed to capture him, the Bush administration then turned to Saddam Hussein. Milosevic's European and white identities precluded the racial logic that characterize representations of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. Rather, the media demonized the Serbian leader through references to World War II, associating ethnic cleansing with the Holocaust and Milosevic with Hitler.11 Drawing these parallels provides the symbolic connection to a historical genocide that in turn locates the Serbian leader, and by extension Serbia itself, as outside of civilized nationhood. Individualizing this violence, furthermore, dehistori- cizes the complexities of the situation (including European and U.S. historical involvement in this conflict). As Fabian (1983) argues, this symbolic association positions the other, in this case Milosevic, in a past distinct from the temporal space of the viewer. In the second week, for instance, all three magazines published the same photograph of a long train filled to overflowing with refugees, many of whom are hanging out of the windows. Extending across the entire frame of the composition from the left foreground into the right background, the train effectively blocks any view of the city behind. This keeps the gaze in the foreground where hundreds of people stand on the train platform.

Pictures like this one accentuate the cultural and geographical distance from the United States to Kosovo/a. As other analysts of American news practices have noted, the media typically represent distant places, espe- cially outside of the West, as a "world of trouble" where disasters, wars, and the breakdown of the social order occur (Morley 2000, 183). The train photograph explicitly historicizes the scene through the visual allusion to the trains used by the Nazis to bring the Jews to the death camps. Such references (and there are many in these reports) render the scene familiar, and presumably sympathetic, to Americans who have at least a popular understanding of the Holocaust. Written texts further link ethnic cleansing to a historical narrative of fascism and ethnic hatred through references to Neville Chamberlain and Czechoslovakia. Using the historical specter of appeasement as a plea for intervention, reporters quoted political leaders who spoke of the possibility of violence spreading to the rest of Europe. Western commentators supportive of the NATO air strikes often warned of the dangers of appeasement as part of a larger appeal on behalf of human rights. The problem, however, is that "this purely humanitarian-ethical legitimization . . . depoliticizes the military intervention" (Zizek 2000, 57). I2 Specifically, the narrative of "humanitarian" military intervention depoliticizes the racial selectivity that determines such intervention. A racialized narrative is evident in the photographs in which Albanian Muslims look white, like the presumed reader, if a little backward. Critical commentators at the time identified NATO's racial selectivity in contrast to the lack of international military campaigns to stop the genocide in Rwanda, or other sites of ethnic/political conflict such as Sierra Leone and Palestine (Chomsky 1999; Haynes 1999).

Throughout the 1990s, American news media extensively reported on genocidal acts of ethnic cleansing and other forms of oppression by Serbian nationalists against ethnic populations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Beginning in 1998, Serbian and Yugoslav forces began an increasingly escalated campaign against Alba- nians in Kosovo. According to some critics, however, mass expulsions and killings associated with ethnic cleansing did not occur until after the bombings started on March 24. In the words of NATO Supreme Allied Commander Wesley Clark, it was "entirely predictable" that Serbian violence would escalate once the bombings started (Chomsky 1999, 37). Critics have charged that NATO and the United States did not wait to exhaust diplomatic and economic options, but instead retrospectively used evidence of ethnic cleansing to justify the bombings (Chomsky 1999; Haynes 1999). While humanitarian issues were of concern to many, NATO prestige was also on the line. Since the end of the Cold War, to reconfigure its legitimacy as an international institution. Interventions in the Balkans were part of a larger effort by NATO to extend its reach to a wider geopolitical arena than the original purpose of the European Alliance. As British Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain explained, "To walk away now would destroy NATO's credibility" (Chomsky 1999, 40).

Arguments about humanitarian intervention also ignore the substantial material interests at stake for NATO and the United States. These interests include investments by arms manufactures and Western businesses, oil companies' efforts to secure pipelines across the Balkans, and the role of the IMF-World Bank in the region. In the late 1980s and 1990s, for in- stance, IMF-World Bank policies that demanded austerity programs to secure debt repayment increased the economic instabilities of the region. Moreover, as the former Yugoslavia broke up, recognition or non-recogni- tion of states by Western countries had a significant and unequal impact on their political economies. Pressure on the Clinton administration also came from expatriate groups in the United States as well as businesses advocating international policies that increased their access to global markets (Haynes 1999).

Penezic argues that Western news depictions of nationalist conflict in post-communist states reproduce a Cold War paradigm that blames ethnic violence and the rise of economic disasters on the former communist regimes and on nationalist overreactions. "Whether or not this was true for the Eastern Bloc, Yugoslavia's situation was not quite that simple. The country has been decentered and federal, with multilingual education, publishing, press, television, and so forth. While this regulated and strictly controlled ethnic tolerance might not have been enough to assuage nationalist hungers, reducing the causes of war to nationalism only is, in my opinion, overly simplistic" (Penezic 1995, 63). None of the news coverage of the NATO bombings discussed the unstable economic and political conditions in the post-communist period, especially the region's relationship to the West and to global economic forces. Instead, all three magazines displayed a U.S. -centered analysis that reproduced a familiar narrative of Western rescue of victims in a dangerously unstable region. As Koshy points out, the American media "still remains primarily oriented to a national context and is thus unable to generate a transnational frame- work of understanding adequate to the complex problems of globaliza- tion" (1999, 20).

Rescue narratives emphasized the vulnerability of Kosovars and the humanitarianism of military intervention. Crucially, the newsmagazines characterized the Balkans as an agricultural area that still relies on primi- tive farming techniques and a place of historic ethnic rivalries. Pictures show people fleeing in primitive modes of transportation, walking in single file on railroad tracks to avoid land mines or walking in desolate landscapes. In Newsweek, for instance, an April 12 photograph shows a man in the foreground pushing a wheelbarrow in which sits an elderly woman wrapped in a headscarf, winter coat, and blanket. Behind them another man also pushes an elderly person in a wheelbarrow and two others walk along the road. This primitive mode of transportation underscores the refugees' vulnerable status while the desolate landscape offers no clues to specific geographical, temporal, or cultural locations. Old helpless women, cared for by men, all of whom appear white, with limited re- sources (wheelbarrows) create a sympathetic portrait. It also renders men solely within a subordinate masculinity that depends on the protection of outside forces while women are visualized as vulnerable and needy because of their age, race, and gender. The exclusive gaze at peasants in a pre- modern setting, of course, also erases the range of material resources and cultural experiences of the Albanian Kosovars.13

Physically locating the conflict in this nightmarish space, pictures like this one and the one of the train station participate in creating what Zizek refers to as the "imagined cartography" of the Balkans that depicts this region as a "terrain of ethnic horrors" still fighting centuries-old battles presumably in contrast to the advanced democratic status of the West (Zizek 2000, 4-5). While this perhaps raises the question of what is the West, it also resecures a cultural map that defines Europe as the countries of Western Europe while the Balkans remain somewhere on the fringes of civilization. These images also play into Cold War narratives that visualize socialism as a failure of modernity. Such narratives deny how transnational dependencies and determinations shape the region's economy. Hyper- inflation, austerity measures, and other economic constraints since the collapse of communist regimes in the region have intensified social and political unrest. Escalating debt increasingly weakened the region's economies, led to worker protests, and fostered the prestige of nationalist solutions by Milosevic and his supporters (Haynes 1999). Yet, news media ignored or minimized local, regional, and transnational factors that have shaped ethnic conflict in the Balkans in favor of representations of NATO heroics.

The lack of references to Albanian politics ignores the complicated and hybrid nature of Albanian identities and political activisms. Moreover, it promotes American national interests at the expense of local and regional factors. The only coverage of Albanian responses to Serbian violence was reports on the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), a small militant group. None of the magazines, for instance, discussed the nonviolent agenda of the Albanian intellectual and political leader Ibrahim Rugova (Chomsky 1999; Mertus 1999a, 6). Photographs instead featured male soldiers of the KLA in combat uniforms, yet there are no signs of actual combat.14 Compared with detailed discussions of American military equipment, strategy, and personnel, reports on the KLA emphasized the lack of equipment, training, and even incompetence of these fighters. This contrast further eliminates political alternatives to the spectacle of victim- ization. Zizek argues that NATO intervened to protect Kosovar victims while making sure they would remain victims; that is, no international support backed the Albanians to become full political agents, or to sustain an armed resistance. He describes this as the "paradox of victimization: the Other to be protected is good in so Jar as it remains a victim" (2000, 59, 60). News coverage of victims waiting to be rescued erases U.S. and European nations' complicity in the economic and political instabilities in the region. Petras further argues that innocent victimization also ignores the violence perpetrated by the KLA. He writes that the "triumphal returns and euphoric rhetoric of the NATO leaders covers up the brutal reality of massive ethnic cleansing, systematic assassinations, pillage and destruc- tion of churches, houses, farms, and businesses by NATO-backed Alba- nian KLA terrorists and their paramilitary supporters" (1999, 13).

As important as it is to publicize the horrors of war and ethnic cleans- ing, these photographs elide any representations of the subjectivity and agency of the Albanians. Cameras do not depict the diversity of experiences and cultures in Kosovo/a (Mertus 1999a). No pictures show people working in an urban setting or creating a makeshift home or treating the injured.15 Nor do readers encounter photographs of Albanian doctors, social workers, community leaders, etc. Instead, photographs depict fearful and/or exhausted refugees.16 In a half-page picture featured in U.S. News on April 12, for instance, the photographer used a high angle shot of a group of refugees. The high angle makes the crowd appear very large as people spread out to the very edges of the background. In the center foreground, a woman holds out her hands in a supplicant pose with the , "Pleading. A woman from Kosovo asks Macedonian police officers to let her cross the border. Thousands waited without food or water." As the focal point of the composition, the female supplicant stands as the representative of the "waiting" group. Women such as the suppli- cant become, in Zizek's words, the "ideal subject-victim in aid" (2000, 57- 58) who do not struggle for their own survival or fight back but remain the feminized object of the Western gaze.

These pictures provide the visual alibi for U.S. and NATO intervention by establishing a national narrative about U.S. power and political good in contrast to Milosevic and his Serbian forces. The racial logic is here reinforced because few signs recognizable to Western viewers would identify the refugees as Muslim. Racial and religious differences are elided in this portrayal of Albanians as allies. Instead, gender is foregrounded through prominently featured photographs of mothers with small chil- dren, namely on two magazine covers and as the opening two-page spread in all three magazines the second week. Collapsing the body with experi- ence and identity, photojournalism relies on the bodies of mothers and babies to function as metonyms for the Kosovo/a crisis. Recent feminist scholarship on embodiment has explored with great insight how identity, especially sexual, gender, and racial identities are produced and repro- duced through visible bodies.17 In the news coverage of the NATO bomb- ings, the visual embodiment of white motherhood, however, does not so much produce knowledge or understanding of trauma as it turns subjects into spectacles of suffering.

As metonyms for victimization, photographs of women and children collapse motherhood with the home (Morley 2000, 65) and in so doing become the visible symbol of what is being threatened and what needs to be saved. For instance, a tightly framed photograph in U.S. News from April 12 shows a group of refugees enclosed in an space that appears to be surrounded by barbed wire (the caption explains that the wire is part of the back of a truck) (fig. 2). In the center of the composition, a woman throws her head back in anguish while a child next to her stares soberly at the camera. This highly emotional expression of innocence and vulnerability establishes the face of suffering for the viewer. In such pictures, sub- jectivities are elided as visible bodies rearticulate racialized gender ideals of domesticity familiar to American audiences (Williams 1994). Despite late twentieth-century social developments that include post-communism, globalization, and new technologies, idealized domesticity continues to {{Fig.2 ommited}} Fig. 2. Photograph by Santiago Lyon. Courtesy of AP/Wide World Photos. have enormous ideological resonance (Morley 2000, 56). Since the Cold War period, the American media have aligned an ideal of the white middle class family with national interests and desires (Kozol 1994). These pictures of refugees from Kosovo/a reveal the powerful place that the racialized mother-child ideal continues to hold in the U.S. cognitive grid. Whiteness, furthermore, contains the otherness of Albanian Kosovars who, like this anguished Albanian mother, lack racial, ethnic or religious markers of difference. If class, racial, gender, and heteronormative ideals shape the cultural alignment of family and nation, what happens when domesticity, that powerful sign of stability and tradition, is figured as the sign of social disorder or breakdown?

Media portrayals of the ideal family typically establish boundaries of identity that exclude all those who do not fit these racial, sexual, and class categorizations. Morley, however, compellingly argues that not all representations of domesticity are so intentionally exclusive. Instead, he writes, "it is not the presence of otherness per se which is problematic but only that of undomesticated otherness," pointing out examples of the incorpo- ration of Others, or what he calls, "domesticating alterity" (2000, 223). In other words, the logics of racialization are often dependent upon incorpo- rating otherness within "the relation of domination" (Taguieff 2001, 121). News photographs of Kosovar refugees foreground racialized gender ideals of domesticity in this moment of profound crisis and social disor- der. Narratives about conflicts in the Balkans have historically been mapped onto ethnic rivalries and hostilities that stereotype populations as violent and backward. During the Cold War, for instance, the American media typically collapsed ethnicity and communism in characterizations of Albania as one of the most repressive communist regimes. In contrast, news coverage of refugees in 1999 turned the camera's gaze to mothers and children to figure Albanians as the innocent victims of Serbian aggression. Ideals of domesticity that feature attractive, white looking, mothers elide differences to establish instead the moral position of the refugees.

The cover photograph in U.S. News for April 12 exemplifies the process of domesticating alterity. Above the headline, "Balkan Hell," three figures in the center of the composition look out at the camera. With a somber but calm gaze, a young attractive woman holds a small child while an older son leans against her. Although the caption does not identify her religious affiliation, the coverage repeatedly characterized the violence in Kosovo/a as an ethnic conflict between Serbian Christians and Albanian Muslims. That this woman is not specifically identified as a Muslim reinforces the process of incorporation within an American ideal of domesticity. Even more than other mother and child images, this photograph evokes the Western Christian art historical tradition of the Madonna and child flanked by one or more saints. In the extreme foreground a woman with her head covered in a white cloth moves toward the picture plane. Her forward posture suggests movement outside of the camera's frame and into the viewer's space. The triangular position of the main figure group creates a stability that counterbalances the dynamic movement of this foreground figure. The compositional and iconographic stability signified by this Madonna and children, as Morley suggests, domesticates the refugees' alterity. This process occurs through foregrounding heteronormativity, albeit normativity at risk. During the Balkans wars, reporters often told of Serbian detention and killings of fathers and husbands. To see the family without the male figure underscores the social crisis and reinforces the call to rescue the mothers and children. Even as this woman is incorporated within an American cognitive ideal of domesticity, however, she remains other in her (unlabeled) ethnicity and in her state of crisis. She is thus both like and unlike the viewer. Looking at how photographs mobilize domes- ticity reveals the ways in which narratives of war incorporate alterity as part of justifications for military intervention.

In the newsmagazines, scenes of destroyed houses, rather than pictures of military battles, further configure the Albanians visually within the private sphere. In American hegemonic culture, the private sphere signifies the privileges of privacy, intimacy, and protection from the external world. On April 5, both Time and Newsweek featured a photograph of a Serbian army tank in front of a destroyed house with signs of still smoldering fires. A Serbian soldier holding a rifle, caught mid-stride in profile, looks defiantly at the camera. Masculinity and militarism foreground the threat to private life and to the vulnerable bodies of the Albanians. The accompa- nying report discusses the invasion of private homes by paramilitary forces where people were either tortured or removed from families and then tortured. Domesticity, as the sign of what is at risk, and hence as the justification for intervention, locates the Albanians within terms recogniz- able to American audiences.

In a region such as Kosovo/a, many reasons compel photojournalists to report on the violence that persists there despite juridical and humanitar- ian interventions by international agencies like the UN or military interven- tions like the NATO air strikes. In domesticating alterity, however, Ameri- can news coverage of Kosovo/a relied on conventions of photojournalism, in particular the figure of vulnerable white maternity, to depict the human casualties of violence in the Balkans. News coverage that represents Albanians only as victims ignores their struggles and experiences while promoting narratives of Western benevolent support for needy and inno- cent refugees. Representations of crises outside the United States, as in this case, are typically mediated through the lens of national concerns, such as security or economic interests. As Koshy writes, "On human rights issues, in particular, the statist perspective obscures and distorts the perception of the problem and the construction of the solution . . ." (1999, 21). Thus, what is at stake in media coverage is the relationship between how social crises are represented and how they are managed within a transnational context.

Given this critique of photojournalism, how can photographers main- tain the moral imperative of political visibility? The challenge of reportage in this case is made particular acute by the problematics of representing trauma. How can photographers visualize trauma without inevitably turning people into spectacles? If photographers attempt to avoid the spectacle of embodied suffering, what happens if we do not have an embodied victim to pity?

## Impacts

### Environment Impact

#### The aff justifies environmental exploitation under the patriarchal guise of national security.

Inwood and Tyner 22, [Joshua FJ Inwood and James A Tyner; Inwood works at the Department of Geography, Rock Ethics Institute, The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA; Tyner works at the Department of Geography, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA; “Militarism and the mutually assured destruction of climate change,” <https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2022.2052720>, p.3-4, March 2022] Mr.Mr.

On the other hand, the military complex understands that ‘climate change is likely to cause an increase in demand for military forces in both disaster response and humanitarian assistance operations’ (Bigger et al, 2021; Brzoska, 2015; Burnett & Mach, 2021; Hayden, 2018; McGrady et al., 2010, p. 5; see also Smith, 2007). Indeed, in 2007 a group of eleven high-ranking, retired U.S. admirals and generals released a report arguing that climate change will act as a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable and presents a tangible threat to U.S. national security interests (Brown, Hammill, and McLeman 2007, 1142). Much of this, however, remains hidden in plain sight. As Patricia Hynes (2014, p. 1) writes, ‘a well-glued solidarity between the military, national security advisors, civilian defense contractors, and government elites has cloaked this debt of pollution, destruction of land, and exploitation of finite resources under the paternalistic mantle of national security.

#### The environment, like femininity, is coded vulnerable and exploitable by the dominant man, which is the root cause of environmental destruction

**Cuomo 16** (Chris, “Sexual Politics in Environmental Ethics: Impacts, Causes, Alternatives,” The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics. Edited by Stephen M Gardiner and Allen Thompson)

What matters in bringing attention to such linked harms is that real harms to bodies—biological bodies, psyches, social bodies/species, pseudo-bodies (eco-regions), and Earthly bodies (bodies of water or air)—are multiplied, exacerbated, and intensified through the collaborative synergies of multiple systems of oppression. Identifying linked harms points to the need for ethics and politics that can address those interwoven systems, and integrate considerations of social justice and environmental ethics at all levels. Regarding sex and gender, which are always interwoven with other factors, the “second class” yet simultaneously exhalted nature of feminity and what is associated with female biological reproductivity is a fundamental feature shaping ideas and relationships in sexist and nature-harming cultures, as is the identification of masculinity and superiority with domination and the absence of vulnerability. A second theme in work focused on matters of sex and gender in environmental ethics is the investigation of the conceptual presuppositions and frameworks, and hence the subtle values, that inform and enable systems of oppression. Philosophers and critical historicans have argued that environmentally destructive and dismissive value systems reflect meanings and symbolic systems built on identities and conceptions of nature and nonhuman animals that create and maintain a general logics of domination (Merchant, 1982; Warren, 1990; Allen, 1992). A guiding theory has been that nature and subordinated groups are symbolically associated on the debased side of western culture’s foundational hierarchies. Rather than being essentialist in an Aristotelian sense, this analysis emphasizes the historical material and symbolic associations between women and nature, and tracks evident patterns in who bears the brunt of the violence. To say that women and nature have been powerfully linked in western culture, and that those association have enabled sexist, racist, colonizing intersecting oppressions and social dominations, is not to imply that all femaleness is identified with only one cultural stereotype of what or how nature is, or that all women suffer the same or similar domination. Different women are symbolically identified with different aspects or fantasies of nature and anti-nature, and those associations have distinct repercussions in exploitative social systems, such as being revered as a natural beauty or being treated as a beast of burden. And naturalness is a pliable designation, for masculinities can be associated with certain ideas about nature and naturalness (physical strength, wildness), and femininity is also often characterized as a domesticating cultural force, or an enemy of nature. What matters for politics and ethics is not merely that nature and femininity are reductively associated with each other, but also that the effects of the association are debilitating and distorting for both. Pernicious cultural and symbolic connections between women and nature as reproductive, submissive, and decorative create and maintain divisions of labor that put women in closer proximity to the material world and symbolically associate femininity with subjectable naturalness, which can or even ought to be molded to man’s needs or whims. Projected associations between “women and nature” and the like propagate subordination and the potential for victimization, for example by compulsively relegating females to the work of caring for others. Hierarchical characterizations of male/female, nature/culture, primitive/civilized are interwoven systems of exploitation that shape and inform environmental relationships at every scale. Understanding sex and gender critically in relation to environmental ethics, and deconstructing the roles certain conceptions of nature play in propagating social oppression, complicates one-dimensional ideas about the nature of environmental problems, and points toward fruitful areas for ethical development and exploration.

### Militarism/Heg impact

#### Militarism creates endless gender-based violence and sustains masculinity in decision making—war makes women invisible and are constrained by sexual violence

**Turpin 97** [Jennifer Turpin 97, doctorate in Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin, “The Gendered New World Order: Militarism, Development, and the Environment”, 1997, <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781315865829>] Mr.Mr.

**We cannot understand the new world order without examining gender and militarism**. Yet women’s invisibility in military affairs and policymaking reflects taken-for-granted international assumptions about the maleness of war. Even though they are more likely than men to become war’s casualties or refugees, women have little or no say in making military or security decisions.

**War and militarism become increasingly dangerous with** the advent of **new technologies**. The past century has witnessed the killing of about 104 million people in wars— more than three quarters of all war dead recorded since the year 1500 (Hauchler and Kennedy 1994:183). Most people killed in war are civilians. But while 50 percent of the casualties in World War II were civilians, in the 1980s this figure rose to 80 percent, and by 1990 it was a staggering 90 percent. Women and children constitute the vast majority of these civilian war casualties.

**Women are also most likely to be uprooted by war**; more than four-fifths of war refugees are women and young girls, who often experience additional violence during their flight. By the end of 1992 there were more than 46 million people who had lost their homes: about 36 million of these were women and girls. In Africa there were more than 23.6 external and internal refugees; more than 12.6 people fled their homes in the Middle East and in South and Central Asia. There are two million displaced persons in Latin America, and about 6 million refugees in Europe. About 2 million people fled the former Yugoslavia (Hauchler and Kennedy 1994:185). While stationed in camps and refugee settlements, as well as in their new societies f residence, **women and girls suffer sexual abuse, abduction, and forced prostitution**. During World War II the Japanese set up brothels in East and Southern Asia, forcing between 100,000 and 200,000 women into prostitution. In the former Yugoslavia, thousands of Muslim women have been forced into camps and raped by Serbian soldiers. Muslim and Croat soldiers have also committed mass rapes.

The continuing **invisibility of women** in war manifests itself, for example, in the fact that the widespread use of wartime rape is still not recognized as a war crime by international agencies. Violence is routinely used to control womens sexuality and reproduction. Soviet soldiers raped approximately two million women in eastern Germany in 1945, and in 1971 Pakistani soldiers raped more than 200,000 Bengali women in the Bangladesh war o f independence. One estimate suggests that during the war against Kuwait, Iraqi troops raped as many as 3,200 women between August 1990 and February 1991 (Enloe 1994:186). Most recently, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, **rape has been used as a weapon** for ethnic cleansing, which uses attacks on women to humiliate another ethnic group and **to inflict genocide**.

## AT: Perm

#### The perm is just the affs attempting to normalize the precarious that the liberal state has pushed to the margins, just like neoliberalism

Lorey et al 15(Lorey, Isabell, et al. , Lorey is a Queer Studies Professor at the Academy of Media Arts in Cologne, works for transversal texts, the publication platform of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. , “Biopolitical Governmentality .” State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious, Verso, London, 2015, pp. 36–39.) //RB

Within the framework of its welfare-state paradigm of protection, liberal governmentality was based on multiple forms of precarity as inequality through othering: on the one hand, on the unpaid labour of women in the reproduction area of the private sphere; on the other hand, on the precarity of all those excluded from the nation-state compromise between capital and labour - whether as abnormal, foreign or poor - as well as those living under extreme conditions of exploitation in the colonies.31 All those who did not meet the norm and normalization of the free, sovereign-bourgeois, white subject, along with his concomitant property relations, and all those who threatened this norm, were precarized. Western modernity, along with its conceptions of sovereignty and biopolitics, is unthinkable without a ‘political culturc of danger’,34 without the permanent endangerment of the normal, without imaginary invasions of constant, everyday threats such as illness, filth, sexuality, criminality or the fear of ‘racial’ impurity, which must be immunized against in various ways.35 The presumed paradox of biopolitical governmentality is evident here in a further aspect: this mode of governing makes it possible, as Cornelia Ott has aptly phrased it, ‘for human beings to learn to consider themselves as unique “subjects”, while uniting them at the same time as an amorphous, standardized “population mass” . .. The reverse side of the “right to life” here is always the exclusion or destruction of life.’36

The liberal mode of governing produces precarities as economic, social and legal relations of inequality through systematic categorizations and hierarchizations according to ‘body’ and ‘culture’. In this sense I use precarity as a structural category of ordering segmented relations of violence and inequality. This dimension of structural inequality, however, is missing in Foucault’s conception of governmentality.-37

Helped by a hierarchizing and discriminating culture of danger, the contradictions of liberal political economy are reinforced in the interplay between freedom and security, self-empowerment and compulsion. As an immanent contradiction of liberal govern mentality, precarized deviance has repeatedly distorted and disturbed the stabilizing dynamics between freedom and security and has frequently triggered collective counter-behaviour and struggles.

From the nineteenth century on, hegemonic economic modes of subjectivation and self-government were not practised in liberal-capitalist societies independently from social protection techniques and institutions. The latter were intended to reduce social insecurity and keep the risk of unemployment, illness, accident and social exclusion calculable for an increasing number of the national population.™ At the same time, the institutions of the welfare state did not primarily serve the protection and ecurity of the workers, but rather supported economically productive self-government techniques among obedient and cautious citizens,3\* who ensured themselves and precarized others simultaneously. This governmental dynamic involves attempts to control the precariousncss shared among all by stria ting and positioning dangerous ‘others’ as the precarious ones at the ‘margins’.

In neoliberalism the function of the precarious is now shifted to the middle of society and normalized. This means that the function of bourgeois freedom can now also be transformed: away from dissociation from precarious others and towards a subjectivizing function in normalized precarization. Whereas the precarity of the marginalized retains its threatening and dangerous potential, precarization is transformed in neolibcralism into a normalized political-economic instrument.

#### Women in IR can’t solve because it doesn’t challenge the hierarchy embedded in nation states, institutions and policy – a complete overhaul is necessary

Gentry 16, C. E. (2016). (Caron Gentry is Senior Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews and Chair of the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section of the International Studies Association, The ‘Duel’ Meaning of Feminisation in International Relations: The Rise of Women and the Interior Logics of Declinist Literature, Global Responsibility to Protect, 9(1), 101-124. doi: <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1163/1875984X-00901007>)

Feminisation as Devalorisation ir scholarship, amongst other scholarship, has always valued masculine traits above feminine ones: rationality of capability over weakness (as well as the rationality of attitude over one informed by emotion); sovereignty over cooperation/dependency.86 Therefore, the discourse of progress and good governance is not only Western-centric but inherently masculinist as well. To demonstrate this I will unpack the feminist understanding of ‘feminisation’. It is not enough to think that simply by ‘including’ women in policies, solutions, or measurements means that progress is being made. This is the assumption that Chakrabarty pointed out as a hypocritical fallacy. Instead, a deeper grasp of what gender is and how it operates as a structure must be understood. The declinist literature is not manipulating women’s positions but it is replicating gender dynamics when it fails to pay attention to certain violence, like structural violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against sexual minorities. Ann Tickner begins her seminal text on gender and international relations by working through a critique of how Morgenthau transposes the rational man onto the state. This has given mainstream ir scholars the presumption that states are (or ought to aspire to being) rational, sovereign actors.87 Yet, as Tickner points out, rationality and sovereignty are masculine attributes.88 In a logocentrism, such as the one that exists in the masculinity-femininity binary, one side is always valued over another. Particular masculinities are valorised— rational, wealthy, white, heteronormative ones;89 most if not all femininities are devalorised.

. The bias towards masculinity is what V. Spike Peterson refers to as feminisation.90 Peterson clarifies that Gender is not simply an empirical category that refers to embodied men and women and their material activities but also a systematically analytical category that refers to constructions of [privileged] masculinity and [devalorised] femininity and their ideological effects (emphasis true to text).91

She continues by adding that ‘the privilege and power attributed masculine qualities depends on the devalorisation of feminised qualities’ (emphasis true to text).92 The creation of gendered hierarchies depend on the ‘natural[isation], depolitical[isation], legitim[ated]…denigration of the feminine, and it is the feminisation of “others” that link multiple oppressions’.93 It is not that the declinist literature intends to oppress—this is more than likely the opposite of what is desired—but that due to its devalorisation of particular violences, this is an unexpected outcome.

Gender analysis can be used to undo feminisation. Gender analysis, or utilising a gender lens, means paying attention to what is socially constructed as masculine or feminine. Gender, like race or class, determines what is prioritised.94 This analysis acknowledges that gender shapes more than people, it shapes organizations, institutions, and states.95 Some feminists see this as an apparatus, a la Althusser,96 and others see this a laddering of sorts, where competing masculinities vie for the hegemonic position.97

Deprioritised Violences  
 The critique of the implementation of ‘feminisation’ in unscr 1325 and development policies is illustrative here. Instead of fundamentally changing how the structural gender inequalities, these policies reified them. These policies fundamentally misunderstood what feminists believe gender to be. They see gender as women, as an operational variable instead of as the aforementioned way of ordering people, organisations, and international hierarchies. My fear is that a declinist understanding of ‘feminisation’ mirrors feminism’s ‘feminisation’. It does so, in the first instance, by minimising, if not deprioritising, violences that are not combat-related. In the second instance, by conflating gender with women and prioritising women’s rights, it fails to make actual change by challenging the very structures that subordinate women and other marginalised peoples. By only seeing gender as ‘women’ it fails to see gender as a hierarchical structure that organises international relations98 (both in what is studied and how it is studied).

When declinist scholarship prioritises the statistical measurement of certain types of violence, particularly combatant death versus non-combatant death, it then fails to see other forms. Specifically, John Gray criticises the declinist thesis for failing to recognise the deaths that happen under dictatorships or due to structural violence.99 Equally, Jacqui True discusses how the declinist literature fails to account for and take seriously sexual and genderbased violence.100 This paper is concerned with how it deals with the rights and empowerment of marginalised people whose identity lies outside of the gender binary that declinist’s modern Western focus cannot account for.

Feminisation in declinist scholarship is defined by rights, empowerment, and legal, if not social, recognition of these. Feminisation in feminist literature is about the deprioritisation of what is seen as the feminine. Feminisation in declinist literature thankfully takes individual security seriously, something feminist ir has championed for decades. Yet, it only pays attention, seemingly, to certain people’s rights, mainly women in the conflation of women and gender. This has led to an ignorance of the issues outlined above. Yet, if we take Hudson’s argument in Sex and World Peace or Pinker’s ‘rights revolution’ argument seriously, it is not just legal rights that matter, but the personal security of marginalised individuals. Since gender and gender identity is not a binary but a fluid and multifaceted spectrum, just looking at women as an indicator of changing norms or progress does not work. It is not just that declinist feminisation scholars omit homosexuality (because Pinker includes homosexuality within his rights chapter), but that the rise of women cannot be a stand in for gender progress. It has to be the rise of all people that ‘fail’ to live up to the hetero-masculine norms.

Among the many insecurities and violences we should then be very alarmed at includes the ongoing and quite likely rise of violence against the lgbtq and hiv-affected community in the us, Russia, and elsewhere.101 Even if lgbtqi rights are more secure, particularly in the West, they are still tenuous. Furthermore, rights, like the legal right to marriage, says little about social acceptance and being free from mental and physical harm. In order to illustrate the difference between secured rights and individual insecurity, the yearly publication of ‘The Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Map of World Laws 2015’ by the ilga is useful.102 The map colour codes each states based upon the strength or weaknesses of their laws recognizing gay rights. ‘Recognition’ is shaded in green—the darkest (highest) green indicates the right to marry or full recognition of same-sex unions. ‘Persecution’ is shaded in a red-scale that fades to yellow. Additional symbols are added to various countries: an exclamation mark in a triangle indicates ‘anti-propaganda laws’; a question mark in a triangle indicates unenforced death penalties; and a shield indicates laws that prohibit discrimination. Finally, a pale citrine colour is used to denote countries without specific legislation. Dark green states, those that recognize marriage or the equivalent, include all of North America, Uruguay, Argentina, Europe, Iceland, and South Africa. Yellow countries with anti-propaganda, or homophobic or homonegative propaganda towards non-binary people that encourages discrimination, but without other legislation persecuting on the basis of sexual orientation is imited to Russia and Lithuania. Algeria and Nigeria are a pale red but with a warning of anti-propaganda laws. India, Tanzania, and Guyana are a mid-tone red as they have laws that could mean imprisonment from 14 years to life for homosexual behaviour. The dark red states include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, and Mauritania. Afghanistan and Pakistan have a non-implemented death penalty whereas Iran’s death penalty is carried out by non-state actors. Therefore, rights for the lgbtqi community are globally unsettled, but the main focus on ‘rights’ and particularly the securing of the right to marry are, in some ways, red herrings as the rights mask the continued violence against lgbtqi folk.

#### Policy cannot solve because policy changes misunderstand gender = women

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## Framework

### C/I – Fem Action Research

#### The counter-interp is to center feminist action research- FAR

Reid 04, (Colleen Reid, Simon Fraser University, “Advancing Women’s Social Justice Agendas: A Feminist Action Research Framework”, published in IIQM) GP

Participatory research and contemporary feminism share a number of major underlying features centering on the analysis of political economy and praxis (Maguire, 1993). The notion of praxis challenges the theory-practice relationship and raises problems associated with value-free science. The term “praxis” originates from the Greek word prasso meaning “doing” and “acting,” in contrast with the theoretical designs of epistemology; theoria 3 (Audi, 1995). Lal (1996) refers to pedagogical praxis the erasing of the boundaries between theory, methodology, and practice, and between field and home (Lal, 1996). Other researchers define praxis as a dialectical process of collective reflection and action (Israel et al., 1994; Kirby & McKenna, 1989), the joining of theory and action so that each is informed by and changes through its relation with the other (Ristock & Pennell, 1996), and the integration of knowing and doing (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). For praxis to be possible, theory must not only illuminate the lived experience of social groups, it must also be illuminated by their struggles (Lather, 1991). Theory is thought of as experience-based (Park, 2001), and reflection itself is embedded in praxis, not separate from it. Action upon reality and analyses of that learning may change awareness of the nature of problems and the sources of oppression (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001). The processes of uncovering marginalized knowledges, giving priority to these knowledges, and enabling the collaborative development of action strategies are simultaneously theoretical and methodological. Woven within and between each of the following characteristics of a FAR framework is the notion of praxis theory, methods, and practice in dynamic interplay. A Feminist Action Research framework FAR guidingPrinciples Through integrating participatory research with feminist theory and research, the following guiding principles for FAR emerged: inclusion, participation, action, social change, and researcher reflexivity. Inclusion The first principle of feminist action research is inclusion. To include is to cause to be a part of something, to consider with, or to put into a group (Morris, 1982). Feminist action researchers contend that no social practices or activities should be excluded as improper subjects for public discussion, expression, or collective choice; no one should be forced into privacy (Young, 1990). Gender and women‟s daily experiences are central in the construction of theoretical frameworks and feminist action research methods. Women‟s experiences are central in several ways in understanding patriarchy as a system of domination and oppression, in identifying key issues and questions in all phases of the research process including action and evaluation, and in giving explicit attention to how women and men as groups benefit from the project.4 Feminist action researchers expose the inadequacy of androcentric research and its partial, inaccurate, and incomplete representation of human experience when women are muted (Maguire, 2001). By beginning with the experiences and research needs of women who have traditionally been silenced, the process of knowledge production is transformed and the ideological power base is challenged (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). Feminist action researchers seek to connect the articulated, contextualized personal with the often hidden or invisible structural and social institutions that define and shape our lives. Feminist action researchers attempt to make possible the development of strategies and programs based on real life experience rather than theories or assumptions, providing an analysis of issues based on a description of how women actually experience those issues (Barnsley & Ellis, 1992). Participation Inclusion is a precursor to the second principle of feminist action research participation. To participate is “to take part, join, or share with others” (Morris, 1982). Feminist action researchers are committed to making women‟s voices more audible and facilitating women‟s empowerment through “ordinary talk” (Maguire, 2001).

### Discussing precarity good

#### Precarity needs to explored in the debate space to search for common notions and go against the logic of security

Lorey et al 15(Lorey, Isabell, et al. , Lorey is a Queer Studies Professor at the Academy of Media Arts in Cologne, works for transversal texts, the publication platform of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. , “Care Crisis and Care Strike .” State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious, Verso, London, 2015, pp. 92–94.) //RB

The Precarias’ derive inscribes itself in the tradition of ‘militant research’, generating ‘minor knowledge forms’ for the purpose of self-organization. This practice refers back to the idea of co-research associated with the Italian workers’ movement of the 1970s, as well as to practices of consciousness-raising deriving from second-wave feminism.4 Starting from their own precarized existences, in their encounters and affections with other precarious they seek to break through the isolation and individualization of post-Fordist living and working conditions.5 They traverse not only places of work, residence, shopping and meeting, places of sexuality and of transport, but also the different modes of subjectivation involved. The Precarias a la deriva start, first of all, from their own different experiences of precarity and precarization, in order to enable a common orientation with others in the derives. This orientation is not directed to a goal, but emerges in practice. In the derive they pass through social spaces and explore the conditions of precarized everyday life, in order to find out, first of all, what a common struggle against precarity and precarization might mean.6 As they start from the presupposition that the precarious goes far beyond the realm of work and covers the whole of existence, there is no search for a common identity that would conjoin everyone into a unity. Instead, the Precarias are interested in inventing ‘common notions’ in Spinoza’s sense.7 Such notions are formed by way of the affective connections of bodies, through what they have in common in their mutual affections. Common notions arise through actualizing that ‘which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body\s Developed in encounters with others, in exchanges with them, both the multiplicity and the singularities of existence manifest themselves in common notions.

Similarly to Butler, the Precarias also argue against traditions of thinking that refuse our fundamental social relationality, warn against infection by others, maintain a logic of individualism and security, and thus perceive precarization solely as a threat. They contrast this kind of social and political logic with a ‘logic of care’/ situating the term ‘reproduction’ and the multiplicity of care activities associated with it in the context of post-Fordist production conditions, and taking into consideration the new forms of communicative knowledge and affect work. In their militant research the Precarias focus not only on housework, nursing, child-raising and education, but also on work in call centres and sex work.10 Enhancing the status of these care activities enables alternative political responses to current problems, which the interminable reformulations of the logic of threat and security are not capable of providing. Contrary to the tradition of the political of a ‘care community’, a cuidadania.'11

### K2 politics

#### FW - Realism’s relationship to gender is problematic and a feminist analysis is crucial to understand conflict

Sjoberg 2013 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida. *Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War* (Print Book)) CL

* This card is basically just a better version of the previous one but I’m gonna keep the old one there in case anyone wants it

This is not to say that mainstream war studies has never paid any attention to gender, or that gender has been completely absent from critical theorists’ work on war and conflict. It is, instead, to make two distinct (and hopefully more modest) claims. The first is that, to the extent that gender has been taken up in war theorizing, it remains peripheral and has not become a central part of research programs outside feminist security studies considering the nature, constitution, causes, and consequences of war(s).326 The second is that, to the extent that mainstream studies of war have considered gender, they have actually been largely talking about a partial and limited idea of gender that involves women as a biological sex being imbued with characteristics gendered feminine for the purpose of analyzing war.327 This second claim will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, when I lay out this book’s feminist approaches to studying war ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically. For now, it is the first claim—that gender theorizing remains absent from (and when not absent from, marginal to) both mainstream and critical war theorizing—that lays the foundation for this book’s work. In the remainder of the text, I seek to analyze and problematize “genderless” war studies. In calling war studies genderless, I am not implying that it is somehow gender neutral or without gender implications. Quite the opposite, I am arguing that it is impossible to think about war well without gender analysis and that doing so obscures the empirical operation of and normative consequences of gender in the nature, causes, performances of, and consequences of war(s). Gender is necessary, conceptually, to understanding the nature of war(s); empirically, to understanding wars’ causes and consequences; ethically, to understanding its implications; and prescriptively, to understanding how to stop wars. Gender does “analytical and normative work” and serves as a “resource for thought” in almost every aspect of how we fight wars and how we read them.328 War, wars, and the study of both are fundamentally (if not unalterably) gendered and, therefore, feminist theorizing about war is not only a part of, but a crucial piece of, the war puzzle.329 Feminist theory “raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics” in war theorizing.330 Also, when I call war studies genderless, I am not arguing that the work I outlined in this chapter does not have a relationship with gender theorizing—I am arguing that its relationship is (normatively and empirically) negative, problematic, and untenable. These relationships between gender theorizing and security or war studies have variously been called “impossible,”331 “awkward,”332 “uneasy”333 “limited,”334 and akin to “exile.”335 While (many in) IR generally and security studies specifically have conceded that feminist scholarship may exist at the margins, gender analysis “does not simply ‘add’ gender to an unchanged object of study, but… force[s] a more radical rethinking of what properly constitutes I/international R/relations to begin with, transforming the boundaries and conceptual basis.”336 This work starts with the feminist analysis of and deconstruction of war theorizing. It requires showing the gendered nature of that theorizing, of the meaning, causes, and consequences of war(s) at each level of analysis.

# Fem IR Supplement – AFF

### Alt fails—Ivory Tower

#### The oxymoronic act of reading their K in the debate space dooms the alt.

**Stern and Towns 22**, [Maria Stern, Ann E. Towns, “Feminist IR in Europe: Knowledge Production in Academic Institutions,” <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-91999-3>, 2022] Mr.Mr.

Scholars’ geographical locations matter for a number of reasons to do with the politics of knowledge (some of which are discussed above), and they also matter because they can shape the types of research that is possible. While in some locations (e.g. in Hungary) it may be impossible to conduct feminist research in an academic institution at all, practical issues in other locations—such as the priorities and methodological biases of funding bodies, the relative permissiveness of risk assessment regimes, and the possibility of getting research access into military institutions—all shape what types of feminist research are possible. This likely plays out in different ways across Europe, but I offer a couple of examples from the UK here because, given that most scholars are located in the UK, this likely has the most significant impact on the field as a whole. The most immediate point here is that the concentration of scholars in the UK leads to an disproportionate focus in the literature on the UK military, but there are also more subtle factors at play. Many UK institutions have cautious travel risk assessment policies that somewhat simplistically (and influenced by a colonial mindset) divide the world into ‘low risk’ and ‘high risk,’ or even ‘hostile’ locations. Anecdotally, this may result in researchers being denied permission to carry out fieldwork in certain locations in a way that would not happen, for example, in Sweden, where universities do not seem to follow restrictive travel risk assessment regimes. Similarly, the quantity of scholarship that does exist on the British military perhaps masks the often difficult processes required to gain approval to conduct research with members of the institution itself, which particularly constrain research that is interpretive, critical, and/or feminist. The power and biases of military gatekeepers in the British context have doubtless prevented and/or reshaped feminist research that would otherwise have been conducted (Basham and Catignani 2021). It is not possible, of course, to conduct a review of literature not published and research 2 DISPARITIES AND DIVERSIFICATION … 25 not carried out. However, the point I want to make here is that it is not only intellectual interest that drives how feminist scholars in Europe select the focus of their research, it is also political economic realities and the constraints of requiring various forms of institutional permission. These realities shape the body of feminist literature on war and militarism that is produced across Europe in powerful, if usually unseen, ways.

### Turn—Gendered politics check bioweapons

#### Gender politics deter use of bioweapons – patriarchal militaries don’t want to use “feminine” weapons.

**Cecire 9**, [Ruth Cecire, “Bioweapons: Postmodern Ruminations on a Premodern Modality,” <https://sci-hub.se/10.2307/40607923>, Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65] Mr.Mr.

The feminine/masculine divide is a (or perhaps "the") critical hermeneutic through which each society constructs experience, assigns meaning, and asserts its basic values. Bridging the essentialist/constructionist rift, I would argue that this divide is informed by a conflation of biological difference and cultural representation. It is my contention that **bioweapons have been disdained and ostensibly banned, at least in part, because they are largely gendered female** and, hence, do not serve the fantasies and ends of the patriarchal war system; their semi-androgynous amalgam of science and disease fuels and substantiates extant culture and gender wars. As instruments of terror for the aforementioned "disenfranchised" nations and groups, they connote the mythical "furies" of "disempowered" female rage. That is not to say that bioweapons will never be employed by First World powers but, rather, that gendered perceptions shape their geopolitical status and deter potential use.

### A2 Hypermasculine Warmaking (Sjoberg)

#### The hypermasculine war-making thesis lacks predictive and explanatory power. Sjoberg also engages with the “mainstream” in her analysis, which proves that traditional IR is both unavoidable and necessary in feminist theorizing – the perm! Plus, she excludes non-binary people from the discussion of gender IR theory.

Prugl 14 [Elisabeth Prügl is Professor of International Relations/ Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Perspectives on Politics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2014 , pp. 176 - 177 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713003460>] Mr.Mr.

I am sympathetic to Sjoberg’s agenda. Like her, I believe that there is no credible way for feminist IR to develop knowledge on war without engaging nonfeminist literatures on the topic. We may want to disavow the mainstream, but it does not allow itself to be ignored and invariably pops up in our topics, framings, and contestations. Because there is no pure feminist location outside previously existing knowledge, the long-standing debate among IR feminists over whether one should engage with the mainstream or not is beside the point. The question should be instead: What are the terms of engagement and who gets the home field advantage? And on this point I become uneasy with Sjoberg’s method; her dialogical approach does not sufficiently recognize the power relations that underlie her engagement with war studies. The author gives the home field advantage to the other team: She seeks an engagement on a playing field mapped by levels of analysis and structuralism, in a game following the rules of positivism and rationalism. But she is ambivalent about this. In the course of her dialogue, she sometimes plays by the rules but more often than not seeks to change them—a dialogue with feminism cannot be con- fined to positivism and rationalism. Not an easy way to win! Her decision to proceed from mainstream rather than feminist literature compounds the problem. Both the mainstream (“studies of war”) and the margin (“feminisms”) are introduced as diverse. Yet whereas the former is invited to play with well-coordinated teams and mature theories (structural realism, decision-making theories, dyadic theories, domestic politics approaches), the latter is presented as an assortment of seemingly disjointed ideas that are deployed on individual missions to rattle the mainstream. Feminisms do not seem to be amenable to team formation; feminisms apparently are good only for critique. Sjoberg is in good company with this approach: Poststructuralist feminists in IR are similarly wary of categorizing thought. But the approach systematically prevents a serious engagement between existing bodies of feminist war theorizing, hiding the complexity of feminist contributions to an understanding of war. For example, Betty Reardon, Valerie Hudson and her co-authors, Cynthia Cockburn, Dubravka Zarkov, and many others have put forward significantly different theories on war and gender that could be discussed against one another. Sjoberg cites them all, but does not start from this literature. She forgoes an opportunity to valorize it by weighing its merits and developing it, including with tools eclectically drawn from war studies. Instead, she recreates the role of the feminist underdog barking bits of critique at the mainstream and admonishing it that it should be doing better. Alternatively, it seems to me, there are spaces between the mainstream and the margins that could have been more hospitable points of departure. They pop up in the book in the persons of women who do not fit: Lene Hansen, presumably a member of the Copenhagen School but also its feminist critic; Mary Caprioli, identified as a liberal peace theorist but also its feminist critic. By playing on more than one team, do these scholars, and their work, not offer an engagement on a more equal playing field? And could not have critical security studies, constructivism, and poststructuralism provided a setting for dialogue in which rules of engagement are more welcoming to feminist ideas? Indeed, feminists have contributed to these approaches. The book unfortunately dispenses with them in a few short pages. One of the dangers of unmooring feminism from itself and from other critical approaches is that its insights become molded so as to be all things to all approaches. In the process, its core propositions get flattened so they can adjust to other theoretical axioms. This is the case here with regard to gender, arguably feminism’s core analytical concept. Sjoberg develops a “realist feminism,” proposing that gender hierarchy is a structural feature of the international system and a permissive cause of war, in addition to or substituting for anarchy (p. 98). In this approach, gender becomes “genders” (pp. 76 ff), that is, the categories women and men, and gender hierarchy an organizational attribute of states. What is lost is gender as a relational concept and as an analytical category, the usages preferred by many feminists. Casting aside feminist debates about the sense and nonsense of structuralist theories of patriarchy, Sjoberg resurrects them under the mantle of gendering neorealism. In her dialogue between unequals, gender yields to the theoretical axioms of the mainstream. Another casualty of this dialogue between unequals is the explanatory status of masculinity, which has become somewhat contested in feminist IR. In Sjoberg’s hands, hegemonic masculinity freezes into a predictive variable. She hypothesizes that “the more competitive a state’s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war. . . . States with elements of hypermasculinity in the nationalist discourse would be expected to be more aggressive” (p. 100). We are left to guess why masculinities always seem to be (more or less) competitive, what hypermasculinity consists of, and how its characteristics can be known in advance. Despite the feminist truism that gender (and thus masculinity) is a social construct, pro- fessed also by Sjoberg, she seems to imply that too much masculinity somehow brings about war. That is, masculinities always seem to be already tainted with militarism and aggression, suggesting some masculine core that no amount of social construction can overcome. Perhaps it is overdrawn to assign responsibility for this confusion to a dialogue between unequals in which gender is reformu- lated to fit positivist epistemologies; however, a targeted engagement with feminist literatures on militarist masculinities might have prevented this mistake.

### A2 science links

#### Positivism is good and compatible with a feminist framework– the assumptions of science aren’t intrinsically androcentric – if we win the product is good, the process is justified.

Neilson 5, [Joyce, Sociology Prof @ University of Colorado at Boulder, “Vital Variables and Gender Equity in Academe: Confessions from a Feminist Empiricist Project,” Signs 31(1), pp. 1-28] Mr.Mr.

The now substantial literature on the topic describes feminist research as “passionate, scrappy, energizing” (Garko 1999, 167) and also as contradictory, controversial, revolutionary, dynamic, problematic, oxymoronic, explosive, and filled with creative tension. Deborah L. Tolman and Laura A. Szalacha refer to “epistemological unrest” (1999, 10). Michelle Fine and Susan Gordon describe feminist psychology as an inherent contradiction, pointing out that psychological laboratory studies, with their isolation, sterility, and lack of relationships, are designed to “drive women mad” (1992, 11). Elizabeth Merrick (1999) describes her complex feminist reanalysis of data on teen pregnancy as “like chewing gravel.” There is agreement in the literature that traditional methods need feminist-inspired interruption (Harding 1987). Indeed, Ellen Scott and Bindi Shah (1993, 99) cite Beatriz Pesquera as wondering if “we can develop empowering methodologies without examining the whole process of academic production within the university.” Certainly we have accomplished one goal of this article, that is, to capture the contradictory, emergent, and potentially revolutionary nature of feminist research as it is practiced. Backstage, inside-story accounts of research in progress have been contributing to improving methodologies at least since Julius A. Roth’s “Hired Hands Research” (1966). Feminist research is especially known for its reflectivity. It is not surprising, then, that there is a substantial literature of case studies of feminist research projects.16 Indeed, there is so much that Jane Ussher (1999) asks if feminist researchers are obsessed with methods. A second purpose of this article is to contribute to this literature. Our focus is specifically on feminist empiricism, something described in the literature as in transition and controversial even (or primarily) among feminists. See, for example, Sandra Harding’s (1993) detailed comparison between the feminist standpoint, on the one hand, and prefeminist and spontaneous feminist empiricist epistemologies, on the other; Richmond Campbell’s (1994) model of internal feminist empiricism; Helen Longino’s (1993) philosophical model of contextual empiricism; and Lynn Hankinson Nelson’s (1990, 1993) naturalized empiricism. Thus, juxtaposing our reflective thoughts on feminist empirical work with writings by theorists and philosophers on the topic should be informative. Not surprisingly, we do not exactly fit any one description of feminist empiricism—not completely and not yet anyway. Certainly we recognize what Harding (1993) calls spontaneous feminist empiricism in the earliest stages of this project. But our thinking quickly became unstable, transitioning across different feminist approaches.17 To contribute to current discussion and debate around feminist empiricism, how it is practiced, and how it is transitioning, we present a few close-to-the-ground conclusions based on this particular research experience. As stated earlier, we recognized, perhaps agonizingly, that our feminist thinking had outpaced available methods and strategies. This was most obvious in efforts to measure feminist consciousness when we realized that it was impossible to capture conceptual complexities and refinements in a few or even a series of survey questions. We also realized that to generate useful data and capture the thinking of our respondents, we had to abandon our own constructs and temporarily adopt our respondents’ points of view. We saw the same pattern—that our feminist thinking had outpaced our empiricist approach—with respect to understanding salary differences between male and female faculty. We began with an effort to explain (away) via regression analyses the gendered gap in salaries at this university. We ended with critical questions about the larger social structure and culture—questions that are unanswerable within regression-mode thinking. The questions that emerge when one attempts a deeper—behind the numbers—understanding of this pattern relate to the division of labor by sex. That is, answers to questions about salary differences are found in patterns of sex segregation by academic discipline and likely by associated patterns of work distribution (research, teaching, and service) across and within disciplines. These in turn are patterns that reflect the larger societal division of labor by sex. It is interesting that these kinds of substantive questions begin to approach those that constitute starting points for feminist standpoint theory. We cite, for example, Harding’s description of Dorothy Smith’s questions about women’s work that are generated by a strategy of grounding knowledge in women’s everyday experience: “She [Smith] points out that if we start thinking from women’s lives, we (anyone) can see that women are assigned the work that men do not want to do for themselves” (Harding 1993, 53). We come to a similar conclusion—that our feminist work developed similarities to standpoint and postmodern approaches—from our experience of dual vision. That is, as we shifted between views of the university from central and from marginal social locations, from both the inside and the underside, we experienced firsthand the multivocal and complex nature of the realities we were studying. In other words, this process erased, eroded, and undermined any semblance of the monologic voice that usually underlies and characterizes prefeminist empiricism and much of feminist empiricism. Does it matter what we call our practice of feminist research? Does it matter whether what we have described is contextual (Longino 1993), spontaneous (Harding 1993), positivist, internal (Campbell 1994), or naturalized feminist empiricism (Nelson 1990, 1993)? It does insofar as feminist empiricism is still emerging and this work can be seen as part of the transition toward delineating an effective, successful, and transforming version of feminist research. As a feminist project whose researchers are cognizant of the variety of feminist alternatives, it has descriptive and thus epistemological value. As an actual project against which primarily theoretical work can be compared, its value is in its very doing. Why confessions? This account feels confessional in the sense that alternatives to feminist empiricism—standpoint and postmodern feminism—seem more cutting edge because they are more deliberately critical of traditional ways of producing knowledge. We felt apologetic for continually falling back on known empiricist strategies when we were thinking more radically and aware of being constrained methodologically. This is an odd stance to take, though, since feminist empiricism has been revolutionary in its contribution to women’s liberation, and, as Francesca Cancian (1996) and Longino (1993) point out, despite much writing about creating innovative methods, most feminist work revises mainstream methodologies. (An oft-repeated theme in the literature is that feminism is not in the methods per se but in their use.) Postmodern thinking in particular is often more exhilarating and challenging theoretically, yet insofar as it rejects grand theory, large-scale models, and indeed any kind of generalization, it poses almost irresolvable empirical challenges. Our theme that feminist empiricism is outgrowing its traditional methods is worth pursuing through further analysis of specific research projects such as the one we describe. For now, we continue to stretch and expand the research paradigm with which we began.

### Perm

#### Perm do both - IR is not over-determined by gender – their scholarship creates new biases without disrupting masculinity – we’ll win even under their framework

Caprioli 04 [Mary, Professor of Political Science – University of Tennessee, “Feminist IR Theory and Quantitative Methodology: A Critical Analysis”, International Studies Review, 42(1), March, <http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0020-8833.00076>] Mr.Mr.

The derision with which many conventional feminists view feminist quantitative studies persists to the detriment of both feminist and other types of IR scholarship. As Jan Jindy Pettman (2002) has argued, however, no single feminist position exists in international relations. One of the most common feminist critiques of feminist quantitative research is that scholars cannot simply "add gender and stir" (Peterson 2002;Steans2003), for gender is not just one of many variables. Yet, gender is one of many variables when we are discussing international issues, from human rights to war. As Fred Halliday (1988) has observed, gender is not the core of international relations or the key to understanding it. Such a position would grossly overstate the feminist case. Gender may be an important explanatory and predictive component but it certainly is not the only one.260 Such a critique only serves to undermine the feminist argument against a scientific methodology for the social sciences by questioning the scholarship of those who employ quantitative methodologies. One does not pull variables "out of the air" to put into a model, thereby "adding and stirring." Variables are added to models if a theoretical justification for doing so exists. Peterson (2002:158) postulates that "as long as IR understands gender only as an empirical category (for example, how do women in the military affect the conduct of war?), feminisms appear largely irrelevant to the discipline's primary questions and inquiry." Yet, little evidence actually supports this contention—unless one is arguing that gender is the only important category of analysis. If researchers cannot add gender to an analysis, then they must necessarily use a purely female-centered analysis, even though the utility of using a purely female- centered analysis seems equally biased. Such research would merely be gender-centric based on women rather than men, and it would thereby provide an equally biased account of international relations as those that are male-centric. Although one might speculate that having research done from the two opposing worldviews might more fully explain international relations, surely an integrated approach would offer a more comprehensive analysis of world affairs. Beyond a female-centric analysis, some scholars (for example, Carver 2002) argue that feminist research must offer a critique of gender as a set of power relations. Gender categories, however, do exist and have very real implications for individuals, social relations, and international affairs. Critiquing the social construction of gender is important, but it fails to provide new theories of international relations or to address the implications of gender for what happens in the world. Sylvester (2002a) has wondered aloud whether feminist research should be focused primarily on critique, warning that feminists should avoid an exclusive focus on highlighting anomalies, for such a focus does not add to feminist IR theories.

#### Our methods are compatible

Hudson et al 10 [Valerie M. Hudson, Prof of Poli Sci at Texas A&M University, PhD in Poli Sci from Ohio State R. Charli Carpenter, Associate Prof of Poli Sci at the University of Massachussetts-Amherst, PhD in Poli Sci from the University of Oregon; Mary Caprioli, Associate Prof of Poli Sci and Director of the International Studies program at the University of Minnesota-Duluth, PhD from the University of Connecticut; “Gender and Global Security,” from The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark]

We acknowledge the important role played by some IR feminists in critiquing/expanding security studies to be more inclusive of women's needs. But it is also true that deploying gender as a variable and a category of analysis has contributed important insights to security studies, which must be taken seriously by security studies scholars not only for feminist reasons, but because security scholars – and policy makers – miss much of what is going on by ignoring gender. **We reject the claim that IR feminist approaches require non-quantitative methods or a critical theoretical epistemology, a claim which has in the past been reified both by IR feminists** (Tickner 2005) and by those writing within the IR mainstream (e.g., Carpenter 2003). **As Mary Caprioli has argued, much quantitative work is also relevant to feminist questions** (Caprioli 2004). We agree with Robert Keohane (1989) that gender as a category of analysis can contribute something to IR as conventionally defined, and it is this contribution which we explore in this essay. In our view, **seeking to integrate gender more fully into the discipline of security studies serves to validate the empirical insights yielded by many feminist IR scholars by taking them seriously within the mainstream**. While methodologies and specification of explanans and explanandum may differ from the work cited above, **such analysis can indeed be consistent with “rethinking security on feminist grounds.” By drawing on empirical insights from gender theory, while speaking to the major concerns of international security studies** as a discipline, the **literature on gender and security can speak to both IR feminists and security studies scholars**. In this essay, we will concentrate on what this literature can say to mainstream security studies, whose primary concerns are, following Walt: “the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war (1991:212). **Taking a gender perspective need not entail a rejection of conventional concepts, methodologies, or questions that define the discipline.** Unlike the critical feminist scholarship, which is skeptical of conventional methodologies, this literature review includes a range of **empirical scholarship on gender,** whether qualitative or quantitative, positivist or constructivist, that **make a meaningful contribution to security studies**.

### Essentialism-ish

#### The kritik’s framing of women as victims steals female power – turns the K.

**Stringer 2k,** [Rebecca, “’A Nietzschean Breed’: Feminism, Victimology, Ressentiment,” Why Nietzsche Still? Reflections on Drama, Culture, Politics. Pg. 249-251] Mr.Mr.

There is nothing wrong with identifying one’s victimization. The act is critical. There is a lot wrong with moding it into an identity. Naomi Wolf, Fire with Fire. Feminist debate about victimology is not new, but its appearance in the feminist popular press is. That discourse about feminist victimology has attracted substantial contributions from popular press feminists is an indication of this discourse’s significance to feminism’s appeal as a social movement, indeed to feminism’s “marketability” as a cultural formation. For these contributions aim precisely to revitalize feminism’s appeal, to rewire its “marketing strategy,” in order to overcome the “alienation” of “ordinary” women from feminism that, they argue, victimology has brought into effect. Although Denfeld, Wolf, and Roiphe have been vocal about their disagreements with one another, their accounts of “the victim problem in current feminism” have more substantive similarities than differences, with Wolf having produced the most generous and systematic account. The manner in which they deal with victim feminism follows the same line, and both Denfeld and Wolf exhibit the same desire to cure feminism of victimology and charge inexorably toward an alternative. What, then, is feminist victimology, or victim feminism? It can be understood in general terms as an attitude fueled by the belief that women are victims of power, where power is understood exclusively as man’s capacity to dominate – a capacity given a fixed and central place in a social order (patriarchy) that fosters its systematic and repeated expression. In short, and to exemplify, relations between the sexes are understood as “a system of sexism in which men as a group have access to power and privilege that women do not have.” This understanding of the sexed distribution of power is posited as an exhaustive account of the power and, as such, breathes life into an elaborate feminist morality. Feminist victimology is, on all accounts, a morally righteous kind of feminism. The experience of powerlessness (women’s experience, whether they “realize” it or not), as the inverse and opposite of power, is the raw material from which the injurious effects of domination can be tabled. As Wolf writes, victim feminism proffers definitive judgment on good and evil with reference to sexual difference and thereby “casts women themselves as good and men themselves as wrong.” A mantle of virtue is bestowed on women and their distinctive ways of doing things, on account of their radical subjection to power, while men “as a group” take on the suits of evil as they are cast as the source of harm. Under the auspice of victim feminism, resistance to domination begins with the process of articulating and tabling its effects to produce an undistorted view of how domination really works, where the responsibility for it really lies, and who stands outside of it – who can, at the end of the day, be evacuated to a position that is, morally speaking, “above” domination and outside of power. Wolf’s criticism of situating feminism’s constituency outside of power is that it “urges women to identify with powerlessness even at the expense of taking responsibility for the power they do possess.” It follows from this that adherents to a victimological line of thinking would avoid registering the figure of the consciously and deliberately powerful woman – who is not, and does not desire to be, above or outside of power – much less the workings of power within its own auspice. The possibility that women and feminists might themselves practice and participate in domination, that not all men have or use the capacity to dominate, that power expresses itself in forms other than domination, is rendered unthinkable if power is conflated with male domination. This much is noted by Denfeld, who argues that victimology makes some women’s conscious participation in “racism, sexism, and violence” at most invisible and at least excusable. For Denfeld, under the auspice of victim feminism women are cast not only as victims but also as dupes. This casting serves a dual purpose. First, some women’s participation in regimes of domination can be excused as “manipulated by negative male ideas.” Second, anointing patriarchy with great powers of deception is an effective means of defending feminism against negative criticism. Denfeld writes, If you don’t agree with current feminists about the enemy, that’s only another sign that he exists.” Victimology, on Denfeld’s account, embraces a hopeful purity of position and registers anything less as contaminated compromise. We can add to Denfeld’s complaint that a victimological perspective will evade the idea that not all experiences of powerlessness are the same and should not, therefore, be collapsed under a single moral claim and that the experience of powerlessness offers no less distorted a view than does the “power-infused” view with which it competes politically. Wolf argues that victimology is especially impoverished in the respect that it inhibits the registration and representation of women’s capacities to assume positive relationships to power. It dwells exclusively on powerlessness, “molding it into an identity,” ratifying and regenerating, rather than transforming, socially derived stereotypes of female weakness and vulnerability. Moreover, having granted victimhood the status of a grand category into which women as a group can be hereded, feminists effectively eschew the conceptual strategies at their disposal for overcoming victim identity. As Sandra Harding has commented, “Victimology… often hide[s] the ways in which women have struggled against misogyny and exploitation.” Harding’s comment indicates that even as a victimological perspective can have a dramatic reversal of the social order in mind – for men must be made to repent for the injuries they have caused by relinquishing the values, ideals, and sociocultural configurations that secure their power – the very logic through which relations of power are conceived from this perspective works against registration of struggle (successful and otherwise) with these values, ideals, and sociocultural configurations.